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Abstract 
 Rivalry is competition for the same objective or for superiority in the same field. Sport is 
replete of rivalries between teams within region or division, offering a desirable living laboratory. 
Moreover, rivalry influences demand for sport, infusing significance to each match. Especially in 
the National Football League, the most watched league in the United States, divisional teams are 
considered to be in rivalrous relationships. However, relatively little attention have been paid to 
the rivalry effect in the television viewership, especially examining the within-game changes. 
Moreover, most of the studies in sport context have heavily focused on home market games. This 
thesis therefore investigates the effect of rivalry on sports viewership of out-of-market games to 
shed light on how sports fans may act when rival teams are involved.  
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
According to Oxford Dictionaries (2014), rivalry is defined as “competition for the same 
objective or for superiority in the same field” (p. 2). Moreover, Sanford and Scott (2014) stated 
that “rivalry is the essence of athletic competition.” Rivalry between sports teams may occur in 
the context of a single match or competition for league standings. Presumably, no sports team in 
the world plays to lose, offering their best to defeat the opponent. The reward of defeating a rival, 
however, amplifies the ecstasy of victory.  For instance, Yonsei University and Korea University 
are the most prestigious rival schools in Korea. This rivalry has developed since they first met in 
sports competition in 1925. They compete in both in academics and sports. Every year they hold 
sporting matches between the two universities for two complete days, and even the naming of 
this annual event is contentious; Yonsei University students call it the “Yon-Ko” match while 
Korea University students call it the “Ko-Yon” match. During this event, students become more 
fanatic and loyal to their affiliated school than ever. The two universities prepare for this event 
by recruiting best student athletes and training them for whole year since the result of this rivalry 
match is meaningful. The victory or defeat lingers for an entire year, when the next match’s 
chapter is added to the story. Moreover, exhibition of their superiority in sports by winning alone 
gives students and athletes the unmeasurable pleasure and pride within this rivalry.  
Although sports fans could simply develop animosity towards their opponent through 
their affiliation, rivalry could also be developed due to regional conflict, political disagreement, 
or past bad blood. South Korea and Japan, for example, are well-known rivals in East Asia. Due 
to the proximity of the countries, and through Korea being the closest path for Japan to gain 
access to the continent, there have been numerous conflicts throughout the history. Among these 
 2 
 
conflicts, the invasion of Japan in 1592 – the Imjin War – lasted almost a decade and left Korea 
with devastating political, economic, and cultural troubles. This was the starting point for 
Koreans to cultivate animosity towards Japan. Moreover, in late 19
th
 century and 20
th
 century, 
countless military conflicts and political pressure from Japan eventually led colonization of 
Korea from 1910 to 1945. Even after the independence, numerous issues involving past violence 
of Japan within Korean territory still continues today.  
With the backdrop of all these historical events and political disputes, Koreans have 
developed deep detestation towards Japan. As a consequence, Koreans tend to compete directly 
in various areas, such as Samsung and Sony or Hyundai and Toyota in the industrial sector. 
Moreover, as Mangan, Kim, Cruz, and Kang (2013) stated, sport in contemporary society is used 
as a mean to bring national interest on the field so that sports games between Korea and Japan 
are one of the most visible and legitimate ways for Koreans to compete against Japan. That is, 
political and historical disputes have spilled over to sporting competition. Moreover, and 
particularly, no Koreans want to see their national athletes being defeated by Japanese athletes. 
Any sports game that involves Korea and Japan is eagerly anticipated. According to a report of 
The Asian Football Confederation (2011), 24.46 million audience from Japan and 8 million 
audience from Korea watched the semi-final of the rivalrous match between Japan and Korea in 
2011 Asian Cup, constituting over half of the total viewers of 63 million.    
Furthermore, there are abundant examples of sport rivalries that were developed through 
geographical and historical dynamics in professional sport leagues. One of the well-known 
rivalries around the world is derbies – sport matches between teams in same local area – in 
European professional soccer leagues. Among these derbies, one of the intense derbies in 
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English Premier League is London derby. There are currently 6 teams that play in English 
Premier League in London district, 13 teams if minor leagues are included. One of the longest 
standing London derbies is the North London derby between Arsenal F.C. and Tottenham 
Hotspurs. The rivalry started to burgeon in 1913 when Arsenal moved into the Highbury area in 
Northern London only 4 miles away from Tottenham’s stadium (Tansey, 2013). It was not until 
1919 when the rivalry really escalated as Arsenal was selected as a new member of First 
Division expansion which was to include two more teams to the league, going from 18 teams to 
20 teams in total. Arsenal who finished 3
rd
 place in the Second Division was picked over 
Tottenham as the last member despite that Hotspurs had a more legitimate claim to the 
promotion to the by being 20
th
 place in the league that year. The rivalry between fans from each 
team is vicious which is best depicted by two players’ transfer cases. Emmanuel Adebayor, once 
an Arsenal player who transferred to Manchester City only to return to wrong side of the 
Northern London, has left feeling of betrayal and abhorrence to the Gunners (Melman, 2012). 
Former captain of Tottenham Sol Campbell received permanent brand as ‘Judas’ and even 
received death threats when he decided to transfer to Arsenal from fans of Hotspurs (Dillon & 
Cross, 2001). In spite of the overall dominance of Arsenal in the North London derby, of late 
they have been fighting for the fourth place in the league, which along with it, comes the prize 
and revenues associated with Champions League qualification (Prenderville, 2014). 
Another renowned rivalry around the world is El Clasico in Spain’s La Liga. El Clasico is 
defined as any match between FC Barcelona and Real Madrid in the league, Copa del Rey, or 
Champions League. Over 400 million spectators in more than 30 countries all over the world 
turn their television on to watch these games (Goal, 2012). This rivalry is also commonly 
described as competition of best talents in the world, Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo (Rigg, 
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2014). More recently, another rivalry was depicted from summer 2013 transfer of Neymar to 
Barcelona and Gareth Bale to Real Madrid with astronomical contract (Buxton, 2014). 
While other heated sports rivalries certainly exist, the preceding examples are but a few 
of the may supporting the need for further scholarship on sports rivalry. Sports rivalry has an 
idiosyncratic charm that result in increased competitiveness on field and fanatic support of fans. 
This thesis offers one manner in which rivalry is connected to other featured areas of sport 
management literature, in this case the demand for sport. 
There is an old adage amongst the U.S. sports fans that can be applied to any teams 
saying that “my two favorite teams are my team and whoever plays my rival.” This proverb 
reflects an interesting implication how fans perceive their rival and any other opponents going 
against their rival. The term schadenfreude is loanword from German, which means ‘pleasure 
derived from the misfortune of others.’ Hence, the context of the adage reflects schadenfreude in 
a way that it can be interpreted as a notion where sports fans demonstrate higher interest in 
games where their rivals are failing. This idea was supported by findings of Zillmann et al. 
(1989), where they found that sports fans not only derived joy from their team winning, but also 
from their rival losing. Specifically, this thesis examines consumption patterns of the National 
Football League viewership to test whether fans are more interested in rivals’ matches than other 
games where the rooting interest is not as defined. The NFL provides an excellent context for 
examining sport rivalry as detailed in further in next section. 
Purpose 
As the price of broadcasting rights of sporting contents rises in every contract negotiation, 
it is yet more important to recognize what draws fans to each contest. Furthermore, the quantity 
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of games broadcast is as great as ever. It is now easier than ever to access to the televised sport 
games of home team but also to the games of their rivals. At the same time, consuming sporting 
games through television has become the most common way a sports fans view games. An 
average of 15 NFL games are contested per week, a number of them broadcast simultaneously. 
Rather than attending to a game at certain time, you can now watch multiple games 
simultaneously through television or internet broadcasts. The NFL signed $27.9 billion contract 
with major networks in US from 2014 to 2022, an increase of more than 60% from previous deal 
(Forbes, 2011; The Wall Street Journal, 2011). FOX will be paying average of $1.1 billion a 
season and keeps right for the NFC games under the new contract, while CBS will be paying 
approximately $1 billion for the AFC games (Flint, 2011). The new contract includes flexible 
scheduling so that FOX can air some of the AFC games and CBS to air some of the NFC games. 
NBC will be paying around $950 million to carry the prime time package of Sunday night 
football. The increase in the deal is not surprising considering the fact that NFL draws tens of 
millions viewers and advertisements for NFL games keep increasing higher compared to other 
television advertisements. Therefore, viewership data alone carries abundant sources for 
understanding demand for sport.  
In this context, delivering optimal games to sports fans will be vitally important for the 
NFL and the major networks since the money involved is significant. For instance, number of 
Super Bowl viewers in 1990 was 73.8 million but it was 111.5 million in 2014, 51 percent 
increase within 24 years (Statista, 2014). Moreover, one of the major sources of revenue in both 
US major leagues and European Soccer leagues is from television deals (Alavy, Gaskell, Leach, 
& Szymanski, 2010).  The NFL assumes that the local games to be the most desirable game for 
sports fans. However, desirability of out-of-market games is yet understudied. Accordingly the 
 6 
 
purpose of this thesis is to provide better understanding of consumption pattern of out-of-market 
games to make suggestions in optimizing the viewership and test desirability. In examining the 
viewership pattern, rivalry takes center stage in the examination of out-of-market games, both for 
the practical value it may play in determining viewership and for our enhanced theoretical 
understanding of how rivalry relates to consumption.  
Contextual Setting 
National Football League 
History. The National Football League is a professional American football league, and is the 
most watched major sports league in the US. Having evolved from rugby, the early stage form of 
American football was played between Rutgers and Princeton in 1869, and gained its popularity 
in eastern area of the US since then (Zimmers & Marini, 2013). The first set of rules was then 
written in 1876 by Walter Camp, the father of American football. According to the NFL history 
chronology (Zimmers & Marini, 2013), the competition between the Allegheny Athletic 
Association (AAA) and the Pittsburgh Athletic Club (PAC) in Pittsburgh area featured the first 
professional football player in 1892, William Heffelfinger. Latrobe Athletic Association football 
team became completely professional with only professionals in 1897 and became the first team 
to play a full season. In the following year, the cornerstone of Morgan Athletic Club formed on 
the south side of Chicago and remains the oldest club in the NFL, now as the Arizona Cardinals 
(Zimmers & Marini, 2013).  
However, professional football was suffering from some issues such as enormous 
increase in player salaries, constant movement of players seeking for best contract, and using 
college players who were still part of the school in the 1920s (Zimmers & Marini, 2013). Hence, 
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demand for universal agreement on the rules was raised. In August 1920, representatives of the 
Akron Pros, Canton Bulldogs, Cleveland Indians, and Dayton Triangles met in Canton, Ohio, 
which gave rise to the foundation of American Professional Football Conference (APFC).  In the 
following month, teams from Ohio, Indiana, New York, and Illinois came together and changed 
its name to American Professional Football Association (APFA). The headquarters of the APFA 
was moved to Columbus in 1921, and first draft of the league constitution and by-laws, territorial 
rights, restriction on player movement, membership of franchises, and issued league standings 
was created. The APFA increased its membership to 22 teams in the same year. Eventually, the 
APFA changed its name to the National Football League (NFL) on June 24
th
, 1922.  
Professional football in the US was not considered as a major sport in the early 20
th
 
century. College football was mainstream football. Some point to the 1925, signing of Harold 
Grange of University of Illinois signed with the Chicago Bears as bringing national interest to 
the NFL (Zimmers & Marini, 2013). 36,000 people gathered to watch Grange play for the 
Chicago Bears against Chicago Cardinals on Thanksgiving Day, which was the largest number 
of spectator in the NFL history back then (Zimmers & Marini, 2013). Afterwards, Chicago Bears 
have left for a barnstorming tour to East, South, and West of the US and more than 70,000 
spectators were gathered to watch Chicago Bears playing against New York Giants and Los 
Angeles Tigers. This is an example of how much college football was popular back then, and 
how a star college player instigated significant positive media attention and impact to the NFL.   
The NFL increased its teams to 22 in 1926; however, the president of the NFL, Joe Carr, 
dropped financially weak teams and the NFL leaving the league with only 12 teams in 1927 
(Zimmers & Marini, 2013). This was when the power of the league shifted from Midwest to East. 
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The member decrease continued until 1932 when they had only 8 teams in the league, the lowest 
number in its history. In 1933, the concept of a division was introduced by Halas and Marshall, 
dividing the league into two divisions with the winners of each division meeting for the 
championship. The first league championship featuring teams from West and East divisions was 
contested between Chicago Bears and New York Giants, with Halas’ Bears winning the title.  
NFL Broadcast History. The focus of this thesis is warranted given the NFL’s broadcast history 
and particularly the impact of television on league growth. In 1939, the NFL first began to 
televise its games on NBC (Zimmers & Marini, 2013). Approximately five-hundred people 
watched the first broadcast of a game between the Philadelphia Eagles and Brooklyn Dodgers. 
The first NFL Championship game broadcast from coast-to-coast was in 1951, and the DuMont 
Network paid $75,000 for that game. NBC paid $100,000 for the exclusive rights to the NFL 
Championship game in 1955 and CBS became the first network to air NFL regular season games 
in selected markets in 1956. 
For the television policy of the NFL, the blackout of home games was established in 
November of 1953. League blackout policy states that any broadcasters that have signals within 
75 miles of a NFL franchise, can only broadcast home games if they are completely sold out 72 
hours before kickoff. This was revised in 2012 requiring teams to set minimum threshold of sold 
tickets, as low as 85 percent, to allow local games to air (NFL.com, 2012).  
Rival Leagues. The NFL has withstood the threat to its professional football monopoly several 
times in its history. The first was the All-American Football Conference (AAFC) which had 
eight teams, including Cleveland Browns, San Francisco 49ers, and Baltimore Colts (who later 
joined the NFL in 1949 after the disbanding of the AAFC; Zimmers & Marini, 2013). The 
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American Football League (AFL) was formed in 1959 by Lamar Hunt with eight teams 
established by the league’s opening in 1960 (Boston Patriots, Buffalo Bills, New York Titans, 
Houston Oilers, Denver Broncos, Dallas Texans, Oakland Raiders, and Los Angeles Chargers). 
The AFL posed as significant rival unlike previous ones and gained national interest. The 
existence of the AFL caused serious bidding wars for the signature of top college players. 
Eventually, the AFL agreed to merge with the NFL into one league before the start of 1970 
season. The NFL kept its name for the league, and the AFL constituted one of the conferences. 
The American Football Conference (AFC) consisted of ten AFL teams—the Cincinnati Bengals, 
Miami Dolphins, Boston Patriots, Buffalo Bills, Denver Broncos, Houston Oliers (Tennessee 
Titans), Kansas City Chiefs, New York Jets, Oakland Raiders, and San Diego Chargers—and 
three NFL teams—the Baltimore Colts (Indianapolis Colts), Cleveland Browns, and Pittsburgh 
Steelers. The other thirteen NFL teams—Atlanta Falcons, Chicago Bears, Dallas Cowboys, 
Detroit Lions, Green Bay Packers, Los Angeles Rams (St. Louis Rams), Minnesota Vikings, 
New Orleans Saints, New York Giants, Philadelphia Eagles, St. Louis Cardinals (Arizona 
Cardinals), San Francisco 49ers, and Washington Redskins—formed the other conference called 
National Football Conference (NFC). This is the basic structure of the NFL that still exists in 
form today, with six more teams added since the merger—the Seattle Seahawks, Tampa Bay 
Buccaneers, Carolina Panthers, Jacksonville Jaguars, Baltimore Ravens, and Houston Texans. 
Structure and Championship. The number of games played by each team during the NFL 
regular season was 12 in 1935, 11 in 1937, and 10 in 1943 due to the Word War II. In the post-
war era, the NFL increased the number of games to 14 games in 1961. In 1978, it lengthened the 
season to include 16 games. Originally west and east division winners met in the Championship 
game. A one-game playoff was contested only if two teams from each division tied for the top 
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record. After the merger with the AFL in 1970, the NFL divided teams into two conferences, the 
NFC and AFC, each with three divisions. Playoffs consisted of eight teams from each conference, 
including three division winners and one wildcard team. The wildcard was the team with the best 
record among other teams without divisional title. In 2002, the NFL expanded into 32 teams and 
realigned its structure to four divisions in each conference. Under this new arrangement, four 
division champions from each conference and two wildcards from each conference compete in 
the playoff and the champions of each conference earn the right to play in the Super Bowl, the 
annual championship game of the NFL.  
NFL Rivalries. The rivalry in the NFL is rarely crosstown rivalries since the NFL generally 
guarantees franchises of regional monopolies with territorial rights. Thus, most of rivalries in the 
NFL come from historical bad blood or frequency of matches. The current league scheduling 
produces three types of games. The first type is the intra-divisional games, where teams from 
same division play each other. Each team meets every other division rival twice during the 
regular season, a home and an away game. Since only one team from each division automatically 
qualifies for the playoffs, matches between teams within the division become more significant 
than other matches. This divisional setting creates rivalry setting that is different from European 
sport leagues where rivalry is mostly established through regional derbies. The second type is the 
intra-conference games, where teams from same conference but different division play each 
other. A team from a division will meet only once with the team from other division and only 
plays either a home or an away game. The current NFL settings implements rotation system so 
that each division teams meets the other division once in every four years. The result of this 
game is also important since it is used as a tiebreaker. The last type is an inter-conference games, 
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where teams from difference conference compete. This game occurs only once in a season, and 
the NFL also uses rotating system for this type of games.  
Due to the significance of the intra-divisional games, it is acknowledged by most sports 
fans that matches between teams in the same division teams carry added importance. The added 
importance may, in turn, evolve into a rivalrous relationship. Nonetheless, some of the traditional 
rivalries in the NFL went through changes in 2002 due to league expansion and division 
realignment. Following are some of the notable intra-divisional rivalries in the NFL. 
Miami Dolphins – Buffalo Bills. This rivalry started in 1966 when Miami joined AFL. 
Both teams joined AFC East division in 1970 when the AFL and the NFL merged, guaranteeing 
the teams would meet at least twice a year. Since then, they have met for 96 times, with the 
Dolphins leading the series by 56 wins against 39 losses and 1 as of 2013. The rivalry intensified 
when the Bills stopped the Dolphins’ 20 winning streak in the 1980 season (Crittenden, 1980). 
This rivalry has been characterized as “one of the stranger rivalries in sports” due to the fact that 
one city lies far North and the other far South and sharing no common ground in image or 
climate these cities have (Iorfida, 2008).  
 New York Jets – New England Patriots. The beginning of this rivalry dates back to 
1960 when the teams started in the AFL as the New York Titans and Boston Patriots. Due to the 
relative proximity and being among the major cities in the East Coast, this rivalry has both 
geographical and historical divisional significance. Moreover, Patriots is in an investigation since 
2007 known as “Spygate” which was accused in public by the Jets coach Walt Michaels in 1978 
saying that the Patriots have stolen the coach signals to win (Ryan, 2013). One of the examples 
depicting this rivalry is made by Patriots quarterback Tom Brady when he commented on HBO’s 
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annual series Hard Knocks in 2010 saying that “…I hate the Jets, so I refuse to support that 
show…” (Ryan, 2013). Recently the Jets have been trying to emerge as a challenger to the 
Patriots’ dominance within the division. The historic head to head result is in favor of Patriots 
54-52 with one tie during the regular season and they lead by 2-1 in playoff competition.  
Miami Dolphins – New York Jets. As both teams started as members of the AFL in 
1960s, they became the members of AFC East in 1970 and have resided there since. Although 
the Dolphins are considered as the main rival to the Bills’ fans, the Dolphins’ fans identify their 
divisional bitter rival as the New York Jets (Iorfida, 2008). The relationship of this rivalry comes 
from a common demographic shift, where large quantities of New Yorkers move to South 
Florida for their retirement. Moreover, before the dominance of Patriots in the 2000s, these 
teams regularly competed for the divisional championship.  
Baltimore Ravens – Pittsburgh Steelers. The rivalry between Ravens and Steelers started 
when the NFL re-launched the franchise in Baltimore in 1996 with former owner of the Browns, 
Art Modell. Due to this relocation, some of Steelers’ fans considered Ravens as their rival since 
they believed that Ravens have inherited the spirit of former Browns. Although the history 
between them is relatively short, this rivalry is considered to be one of the fiercest in the NFL 
and they have been recently closely matched almost every games (Watkins, 2014). The Steelers 
were in the way of the Ravens to advance to the playoffs in 2008 and 2010 since the Ravens won 
the Super Bowl XXXV in 2000 (Hack & Sabino, 2011). The Steelers have won divisional title 
20 times since 1972 while the Ravens won 4 times since 2003.  
Cincinnati Bengals – Cleveland Browns. This rivalry, sometimes called as the “Battle of 
Ohio,” is one of the few intra-state rivalries, with Cleveland representing northern and Cincinnati 
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representing southern Ohio and both team using orange as their team color. The rivalry starts 
with legendary coach and owner Paul Brown. He was hired as the first coach of the Cleveland 
franchise in 1946 by the owner Arthur McBride, and then the team was nicknamed (Browns) for 
him. However, after Art Modell bought the Browns in 1961, friction between Modell and Brown 
started. Eventually Brown was fired in 1963. It was 1967 when Brown bought the Cincinnati 
Bengals franchise in the AFL bringing life to this rivalry (Smirnoff, 2008). After the AFL and 
the NFL merger in 1970, both teams were situated in the AFC Central, which then was realigned 
in AFC North. Nevertheless, this rivalry have been deteriorated due to the fact that the Bengals 
investing the least money and the Browns’ relocation and comeback in late the 1990s which 
made them to be less successful franchises in the AFC North (Smirnoff, 2008).  
Cleveland Browns – Pittsburgh Steelers. The Cleveland Browns were the traditional 
rival of the Steelers. The Browns and Steelers first met in 1950 and have met 124 times since 
then (McNamara, 2013). Rivalry ensued in part due to proximity, 137 miles of highway, letting 
fans of each team easy to travel. Moreover, both cities shares similarity in the population where 
most of them are blue collared and industrial workers (McNamara, 2013). Although the Browns’ 
operation stopped as the former owner Art Modell decided the Browns to relocate in Baltimore, 
the Browns came back in 1999 with playing the Steelers as their first home opponent.  
Kansas City Chiefs – Oakland Raiders. This rivalry began in 1960 when the AFL was 
established and they have been playing the in same division since then, first in the AFL West 
division and currently in the AFC West. This rivalry is one of the most bitter and balanced 
rivalries in the NFL (Cockerham, 2011), 57-51 and two ties with the Chiefs leading.  
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Oakland Raiders – San Diego Chargers. This rivalry is known as “The Holy Roller,” 
which dates back to 1978 when the Raiders wins against the Chargers after the controversial 
ruling (Villa, 2013). The ball had fumbled 24 yards without any passes or run which led the 
Raiders inverse the game from 20-14 to 20-21 when only 10 seconds were left until the end. 
Moreover, the hatred between fans is intense since these fans are known for strong loyalty to 
their respective teams, proximity they had when Raiders were located in Los Angeles, and 
always have been the teams representing California since their inceptions.   
Denver Broncos – San Diego Chargers. With both teams being original members of the 
AFL, the rivalry continued when they merged to the NFL and both were placed in the same 
division. Although the Chargers was known as one of the worst franchises in the NFL, they 
became the Broncos’ biggest rival in last decade winning five divisional title from 2004 to 2009 
except 2005, while the Raiders and the Chiefs were suffering from unsuccessful seasons (Siddiqi, 
2013).  
San Francisco 49ers – Saint Louis Rams. This rivalry dates back in 1950 when the NFL 
merged with the AAFC. These were the first two teams located on the West Coast. Although 
geographical rivalry was lost when the Rams relocated from Los Angeles to Saint Louis, the 
rivalry did not fade away since they kept playing in the same division.  They have played 129 
games since 1950 and have head-to-head record of 63-62 and 3 ties by 49ers leading only by one 
win in the end of 2013 season. 
San Francisco 49ers – Seattle Seahawks. It was not until 2002 that these teams became 
hatred rivals as the Seahawks returned to the NFC West. More recently, the 49ers hired Jim 
Harbaugh in 2011 and Seahawks hired Pete Carroll in 2010, well-known NCAA hatred football 
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rival coaches from USC and Stanford (Branch, 2014; Triplett, 2014). They both have met in the 
2014 NFC championship which resulted in the Seattle’s victory all the way to winning the Super 
Bowl XLVIII. The head-to-head record is a tie of 15-15.   
Dallas Cowboys – Washington Redskins. These teams have been in the same division 
since 1961. Both have won numerous division championships and multiple Super Bowls. 
Moreover, these teams are few of the wealthiest teams in the NFL. The Dallas Cowboys’ team 
value was estimated $2,300 million and the Washington Redskins’ team value was estimated 
$1,700 million in 2013 with rank of 1 and 3, respectively (Forbes, 2013). They have met for 107 
times with record of 63-42 and 2 ties in favor of the Cowboys.  
Dallas Cowboys – New York Giants. These teams’ rivalry lasted more than 50 years. The 
first game between the Cowboys and Giants was in 1960 and ended in a 31-31 tie. It was 
unexpected result since the Giants were one of the teams dominating the league back then. The 
Giants are also valued in 4
th
 rank with team value of $1,550 million in 2013. The head-to-head 
record is 59-42 and 2 ties in favor of the Cowboys.  
Philadelphia Eagles – New York Giants. This is one of the fiercest rivalries in the NFL 
dating back to 1933. The proximity of the two stadiums is less than 100 miles, they have been 
winning the NFC East titles since 2000, except 2009 and 2012, and their fans have natural 
geographical animosity toward each other (Brookover, 2008). The head-to-head record is 83-75 
and 2 ties in favor of the Giants.  
New York Giants – Washington Redskins. This rivalry started in 1932 and deepened 
during the 1980s when both teams competed for the division championship and Super Bowl title. 
The Giants and the Redskins each have earned 8 divisional titles, majority being in the 1980s and 
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the 1990s. The Giants have won the Super Bowl XXI, XXV while the Redskins won the Super 
Bowl XVII, XXII, XXVI during the 1980s and the 1990s. The head-to-head record is 94-64 and 
4 ties in favor of the Giants.  
Chicago Bears – Green Bay Packers. This first game in this rivalry took place in 1921 
with the Bears beating the Packers 20-0. As of 2013, they have played 184 regular season games. 
The fans of the two cities have regional hatred with few ties to bind that spillover to the NFL 
games (Keen & Dodd, 2011). The Bears lead the series 92-88 with 6 ties.  
Detroit Lions – Green Bay Packers. The Lions and the Packers are the longest and 
continuous rivalry in the NFL. They have regularly met at least twice a year with no cancelled 
games since 1932, almost over 80 years to build up the rivalry (Madden, 2013). The Packers lead 
the Lions head-to-head 94-66-7 and 2-0 in postseasons, thus this can be considered to be among 
the most one-sided longstanding rivalries.  
Green Bay Packers vs. Minnesota Vikings. Due to the proximity of respective states, 
Minnesota and Wisconsin, they share a lot of rivalries such as Big Ten rivals. The Packers and 
the Vikings have been rivals since the Vikings entered the league in 1961. When the Vikings 
began its operation in Minneapolis, many fans of Minnesota had to choose whether to 
continuously root for the Packers or the Vikings (Al Bracco, 2009). Some remained loyal to the 
Packers, and this made yesterday’s friend to be today’s enemy for the Vikings fans. The Packers 
lead the series 55-48 and 2 ties as of 2013 season.  
Television Viewership 
Studying the viewership data of the NFL can offer an advantage of revealing various 
consumption patterns that were limited in studying attendance (Tainsky, 2010). Although 
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attendance was the traditional data set that was used to study demand for sport, some limitations 
exist which hinder accurate understanding (Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo, 2005; Buraimo and 
Simmons, 2008; Alavy, Gaskell, Leach, and Szymanski, 2010). First, a majority of attendance 
are season ticket holders who show high level of loyalty for their home team and attend almost 
every game. That is, these fans will attend regardless of the game quality or uncertainty of 
outcome. Second, there is problem of capacity constraint in stadium, where most of the games 
are sold out so that excessive demand beyond the capacity is difficult to measure. Third and the 
most importantly, attendance figures can only provide demand information of the home team 
since majority of season ticket holders are local fans. In other words, it is difficult to measure the 
demand of non-local fans in different markets with attendance figure. By contrast, the television 
audience does not possess any of the aforementioned issues.  
Furthermore, viewership data is better suited in measuring within game changes that 
cannot be observed through attendance data. Rather than looking at the static average, this thesis 
implements an equation that measures the variation during the broadcast. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this thesis, television ratings will be used as the key data to investigate the fan 
behavior of out-of-market games to see the rivalry effect.  
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CHAPTER II 
Literature Review 
 This section of the thesis will look into different fields of studies that are relevant to 
rivalry. The first part is a review of literature in a sport economic context. Demand for sport is 
the main interest of this thesis since it is to understand sports fans’ consumption patterns of the 
NFL games through television viewership. Moreover, the majority of studies in demand for sport 
stem from the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (UOH) where it assumes that demand will be 
greater when uncertainty of outcome is greater. Therefore, competitiveness of the game is an 
important part in consumption of sport. Furthermore, a previous study has found that different 
patterns exist in viewership of the NFL games according to the result and market types (Sung et 
al. 2014, May). However, the effect of rivalry in neutral market games was not tested, which led 
to my interest in extending the study to test different viewership patterns within the neutral 
market games that were defined in the previous study. 
The second part is review of literature on interstate rivalry will offer ideas on how states 
develop “Enduring Rivalry” and how interstate conflicts influence them. It is easy to see 
interstate rivalries throughout the history of international conflicts and wars.  Moreover, these 
studies are interested in how rivalries develop and persist throughout times. These rivalries are 
called enduring rivalries which mostly last for decades, including examples of the US and the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War and the India – Pakistan rivalry.  
 The third part of the review covers firm rivalry. As the cases of Pepsi and Coca-Cola, 
Nike and Adidas, or Apple and Samsung, there are ample examples of well-known firm rivalries. 
According to Hatten and Hatten (1987), strategic grouping is to cluster companies with similar 
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strategies or sharing similar characteristics into each group within an industry. With this 
grouping, rivalry within and between strategic groups is being studied in the stream of strategic 
management literature, but with no consensus on which rivalry is stronger. Since the divisional 
setting resembles the features of between group strategic group rivalries, the strategic 
management literature on this topic offers good insight into understanding the rivalry and league 
structure of the NFL.  
 The last part is the research of consumer behaviors related to sports and rivalry. Some 
literature on sport behavior has found interesting behaviors such as “Basking in Reflected Glory” 
(BIRG) and “Cutting off Reflected Failure” (CORF), foreshadowing distinctive behaviors of 
sports fans according to the result of the games. Moreover, there are extended concepts of 
“Basking in Spite of Reflected Failure” (BIRF) and “Cutting off Reflected Success” (CORF), 
which implies the opposite behavior of BIRG and CORF.  
Uncertainty of Outcome and Rivalry in Sport 
The product of team sport is the game or contest between two teams. The aggregation of 
these games comprises the league product, which offers additional products such as merchandise, 
league standings, and championships as the collective efforts of the teams and the league 
(Borland & MacDonald, 2003). The authors divided demand for sport in two ways: direct and 
derived demand. Direct demand is described as attending games and watching games through 
media, so that it is primarily through individual sport consumers. Indirect demand is not simply 
that of the individual sport consumer, but also other businesses or the government. This includes 
buyers seeking broadcasting rights of the sport, marketing through the sport, a sports team selling 
naming rights to companies, selling seats and advertisement in stadium, and tourism by sport 
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events. They also argued that the effect of “contest quality” matters in attendance. They found 
that attendance is lower in lower divisions, and team success has a positive effect. Moreover, a 
more compelling argument is that average league standing and team performance have a positive 
impact on attendance. 
Borland and Macdonald (2003) asserted that the main driving element of demand for 
sport is “fan interest.” Fans benefit themselves from the sport product in a sense of identification 
and quality of games. Hence, they argue that maintaining quality of games through competitive 
balance and league structure to retain or maximize fan interest should be prioritized for league 
organizers. This idea stems from the view of Rottenberg (1956) who hypothesized that 
competitiveness of each team should be equivalent to ensure outcome uncertainty of the contest. 
When a single dominant team persists to win a championship every year, the overall fans’ 
interest in the league will diminish. His Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis states that greater 
uncertainty in sport games will create great demand. More recently, Rottenberg (2000) supported 
this idea by asserting that a game quality is dependent on uncertainty of outcome and the 
uncertainty is maximized when the winning probability of each team is even, so that 
entertainment produced from the contest of two teams is maximized.  
In studying the uncertainty of outcome, Alavy, Gaskell, Leach, and Szymanski (2010) 
tested Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (UOH) through television ratings of English F.A. 
Premiership matches from 2002 to 2005. This is unlike traditional studies using attendance as 
proxy of demand since television ratings can capture the viewers who switched off during a 
game, which cannot be captured in attendance data. They discovered that their data showed 
consistency with UOH such that more demand were drawn when the gap of winning percentages 
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between competing teams were small. Moreover, they also found that viewers preferred a game 
where either team wins to a game that resulted in a draw. Further, their results indicated that 
viewers appreciated unexpected results after controlling for the expected probability of their 
team’s winning. On the contrary, Buraimo and Simmons (2008) found that attendance in the 
English Premier League (EPL) decreased in games with a greater uncertainty of outcome. In 
other words, home fans preferred their team winning rather than losing or closely matched. 
However, one interesting finding was that relationship of gate receipt and home win probability 
showed that attendance increased not only when the home team is competing against a team with 
extremely lower rate of winning but also when their team is going against a team with higher rate 
of winning; that is, home fans desire to watch their team go against the odds.  
Yet, all of these studies were focused on home team games and home fans; hence, it is 
not evident how fans will react to the neutral market games of their rivals. In terms of rivalry, 
there was an interesting finding from the study of Alavy et al. (2010) that the average television 
rating of “big” matches or derby matches was higher compared to non-derby matches in their 
data which resulted in draw without scores. The total average ratings of the no-score draw games 
were 2.58; however, the average was 2.04 when they excluded “big” or derby matches. 
Moreover, Buraimo and Simmons (2008) found that there was slight increase in attendance in 
derby games in the EPL compared to other games. Nevertheless, these studies are based on 
European league model, which is clearly different from the US major leagues. Unlike the EPL or 
other European soccer league, the NFL’s division and conference structure makes it even more 
idiosyncratic with regards to rivalry. Moreover, the focus of their studies was not in the context 
of rivalry, thus their findings have limitation in explanation of rivalry through television 
viewership.  
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Forrest and Simmons (2002), however, argued that uncertainty of outcome and 
competitive balance should be understood separately. They believed that implementing artificial 
measures to improve competitive balance to ensure fan interest is vague. The result of their test 
showed that cumulative quality of the home team influences the attendance, and distance from 
home has negative influence in attendance. They also discovered that attendance drops according 
to the declining of uncertainty, where hard-core fans are unaffected. With uncorrected odds, fans 
liked both closely balanced and imbalanced matches; nonetheless, these researchers could not 
find evidence that attendance increases when the home team is more likely to win. Therefore, 
their model proposes that attendance is positively affected when the match is well balanced.  
However, their findings do not support the idea that improving competitive balance would 
increase total attendance. They found out that other variables, such as home advantage affects 
competitive balance, thus uncertainty of outcome cannot be correlated. They discovered that 
frequency of home wins are twice that of away wins. Therefore, the argument of Rottenberg 
(2000) that the ideal wining probability should be even would eventually create another 
imbalance if home advantages exist. In this context, studying both competitive balance and 
uncertainty of outcome should be carefully defined and researchers should consider multiple 
variables affecting the outcome.   
Tainsky (2010) have studied the consumer demand of the NFL through television 
viewership instead of attendance data since it is the second greatest revenue source in all major 
league sports. He tested average ratings of home and away market for each game from 2006 to 
2007. This study was the first attempt to identify the incentives of home and away fans to watch 
the NFL games. Through the regression analysis, he found that primetime, years that a franchise 
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were present in current market, and expected team quality had positive effect to the average 
ratings. However, he did not found that divisional games showing significance in his analysis.   
Furthermore, Tainsky and McEvoy (2012) studied viewership demands in the markets 
where there was no NFL franchise. This study also utilized the average ratings of NFL games 
from 2006 to 2007. Some consistency was found as team quality and age of a team were 
positively associated with the average ratings. Moreover, they found that geographic proximity 
of a team to a market without a local team also positively affecting the viewership. However, this 
study also did not find the effect of divisional games, which they believed that it would be 
undesirable to the viewership demand due to its limited number of games compared to non-
divisional games.  
A previous study that shares a similar context to this thesis has examined the patterns of 
sports fans of home team markets and neutral markets through the NFL regular season television 
ratings (Sung, Tainsky, & Xu, 2014, May). The authors investigated how viewership demand 
responds to the competitiveness of the NFL game through television ratings. In this context, the 
purpose of this study was to examine the NFL’s current blowout policy which enables network 
affiliates in a neutral market to abandon the broadcast of games that they deem to be 
uncompetitive to a more competitive game. The essence of this policy is that uncompetitive 
games will be undesirable for the consumers in a neutral market, while this is not the case in 
home market. The authors examined viewership patterns in three different categories of markets: 
a winning market, a losing market, and a neutral market. For instance, if the Bears defeated the 
Vikings, Chicago will be considered a winning home market, while Minneapolis will be the 
losing home market. Each of the rest of the markets that showed this game will be categorized as 
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a neutral market. The data was collected by 15 minute intervals over each game from Nielsen 
Local People Meter (LPM) markets. Then the ratings were calculated by the ratings drop in 
percentages of each game and compared it by market types, which is the same formula this thesis 
employed. Details will be presented in next section.  
The result of this study has confirmed the UOH where there was increased drop off as 
score difference have increased (Sung, Tainsky, & Xu, 2014, May). Figure 2 shows one of the 
results of this study, where average ratings drop increases as the score difference increases. This 
also shows that there is a similar pattern of losing market and neutral market drop off while 
winning market shows a comparable difference. Moreover, there was no significant difference 
between the losing market and the neutral market, while the winning market showed significant 
difference compared to other markets. From these implications, this thesis will investigate further 
into viewership of the NFL regular season to see whether rivalry affects the drop off of neutral 
market games as an extended research.  
 
Figure 1. Ratings Drop for each Interval (Sung, Tainsky, & Xu, 2014, May) 
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Most recently in sport economics, Sanford and Scott (2014) tested the intensity of rivalry 
in college football, especially in Southeastern Conference (SEC), through secondary data of 
preseason ticket purchase. In lieu of attendance, competitiveness, and violence measures, the 
authors utilized a willingness-to-pay approach. Moreover, to control other various factors 
affecting the ticket price for the games, such as within season winning percent or seat quality, the 
authors construct more reliable comparison of fans’ willingness-to-pay for their team according 
to different opponents. Their finding was that there were willingness-to-pay differences of 
several hundred dollars across the SEC school games. In other words, they found evidence 
supporting that the greater intensity of the rivalry induced a higher willingness-to-pay. In this 
sense, rivalry in sport is a significant factor that affects demand for sport, so that it needs further 
and careful investigation. A shortcoming of this study is that it is confined to home market 
games since their data of ticket sales are only in home markets. Therefore, further investigation 
on out-of-market games would help to extend the application of these findings. 
Enduring Rivalry 
Interstate rivalry is one of the most studied areas in political science. Within this subject, 
enduring rivalry has recently gained some interest. Goertz and Diehl (1993) stated that enduring 
rivalries require having three dimensions, which are competitiveness, time, and spatial 
consistency. First, enduring rivalries compete over the same goods and these can be intangible 
(e.g., political, religious, or ideological control) or tangible (e.g., natural resources). Nonetheless, 
it is not always true that enduring rivalries compete over consistent matters over the course of 
time. That is, the issues that enduring rivals challenge change as time shifts. Thus, it is plausible 
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that rivalry can be conceptualized as persistent competition over one or a series of relevant issues. 
Moreover, enduring rivalries should be accompanied by hostility that has a potential likelihood 
of military collision. Secondly, enduring rivalries should be understood as rivalries that continue 
over decades; however, the precise time frame is rather an empirical than conceptual dimension. 
Some rivalries can be established within a year, but most of the enduring rivalries establish 
themselves after a long period time. Lastly, enduring rivalries are mostly between two states; 
nevertheless, multiple states could be involved in a notion of alliance. Dyadic rivalries are 
common, but sometimes alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the United 
Nations can come into the equation. Although a form of alliance is not obvious or possible in 
terms of sport, multiple rivalries can be established through situations where multiple teams are 
situated within same division or city, creating divisional rivalries and regional derbies.  
Arms races are related to the concept of enduring rivalries, and they are one of the 
characteristics that contribute to enduring rivalries, so that it is common to observe arms races 
within enduring rivalries. This competition of increasing arms acquisition between rivalries, 
however, does not occur all the time in enduring rivalries. In the sport context, this can 
correspond to acquisition of talents among rivals. A recent example would be the case of Real 
Madrid and FC Barcelona, the well-known rivalry in the contemporary soccer world. Real 
Madrid signed with Gareth Bale for $132 Million while FC Barcelona signed with Neymar da 
Silva Santos Júnior for $72 Million, and both players are considered to be the among the most 
talented player in their country (Prince-Wright, 2013).  
This study presents several definitions of enduring rivalries. Wayman (as cited in Goertz 
& Diehl, 1993) defined “dyadic enduring rivalry” as “any instance in which two states oppose 
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each other in two or more disputes within a ten-year period.”  According to Diehl (as cited in 
Goertz & Diehl, 1993), enduring rivalry is “any situation in which two nations engage in at least 
three militarized disputes within a period of fifteen years.” A noteworthy point in these 
definitions is that there are minimum time and number of conflicts that is required to establish 
enduring rivalries. In sport, it can be assumed that the more games the rivals play, the higher 
chance of becoming enduring rivalries. This is obvious in cases where two teams dispute over a 
past incident such as misjudgment calls (e.g., The Holy Roller of the Raiders and the Chargers) 
that develops bad blood between respective fans for a long period of time.    
In studying the origin of interstate rivalry, Vasquez and Leskiw (2001) found out that 
traditional understanding of enduring rivalry contended the origin of an interstate rivalry as due 
to repetitive conflicts over periods of times between states while there were emerging ideas 
arguing that dispute-threshold approaches are limiting the understanding of enduring rivalries. 
Early endeavors in studying interstate rivalry defined it as to be dyadic rivalries with minimum 
amount of militarized disputes. All these approaches have assumed that militarized conflict is 
necessary to establish enduring rivalries. On the other hand, Vasquez (1996) argued that 
recurring disputes should be taken into primary consideration in defining rivalry rather than 
number of disputes. In this sense, political hostility and relative gains from disputes become 
crucial in the formation of rivalry; however, it is yet to be answered how to quantify those 
hostilities and gains of each state. These efforts are to identify enduring rivalries before its 
formation. Therefore, Vasquez (1996) defined that both rivals should be competitive and equally 
capable to cause political or emotional threats to become enduring rivalries. In terms of sport 
rivalries, it can also be explained by different approaches. One approach can be explained by 
past bad blood, players’ or coaches’ conflicts on the field, or hatred between fans of respective 
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teams. The other approach can be from a team’s being a threat to one’s team to advance to 
playoffs or achieving playoffs. In order for a team to be a threat, fans must perceive them as the 
most competitive rivalry to duel with their team.  
One of the hypotheses that Vasquez and Leskiw (2001) tested was that two states with 
continuous territorial disputes will likely to become enduring rivalries compared to other types of 
disputes. They collected data on conflicts between two states from history with conflicts that 
resulted in a war. Their data also contains ex ante issues to encompass an enduring rivalries 
formation before reaching the traditional dispute-threshold that was discussed above. They tested 
whether territorial disputes have at least a certain proportion in overall disputes, and also 
measured what kind of dispute dominates interstate relationships. It was confirmed that states 
involved in frequent territorial disputes were likely to become enduring rivals. This is line with 
the finding of Stinnett and Diehl (2001), who discovered that territorial disagreements are one of 
the most powerful conflicts that occur between adjacent groups. Vasquez and Leskiw (2001) also 
found that states with relative equivalent power (e.g., major-major, minor-minor) had territorial 
disputes that dominated their relationship before becoming enduring rivals; nevertheless, this 
was not true in the case of states with different level of power (e.g., major-minor). While 
majority of minor-minor states became enduring rivals through territorial factors, some major-
major states became enduring rivals through political disputes. In sport, rivalry formation 
through territorial disputes is commonly found in the European soccer leagues such as the 
derbies. In the NFL, however, territorial disputes may not be in effect in formation of rivalries as 
European soccer leagues as each team are protected by territorial rights. Moreover, rivalry 
formation of teams with disparate competitiveness is hardly the case since matches between 
these teams will mostly be one-sided.  
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Enduring rivalries, however, have a life cycle which has a beginning and an end so that 
rivalry does not persist forever. Goertz and Diehl (1993) argued that unlike the traditional 
definition of enduring rivalries, the onset of such relationship does not necessarily start from a 
war. Rather, it could be starting in advance before an actual war where certain level of conflict 
arises. The definition of an enduring rivalry in this literature suggests that it begins when a 
certain but low level of intensity is established between two states. Although most of the 
previous studies argue that enduring rivalries start when there is “serious threat to use military 
force,” the authors believe that it would be accurate to consider such an event prior to the 
military actions. However, the ending of enduring rivalries mostly has an unclear event or 
incident that clarifies its termination of rivalry. Moreover, it can be clear as they come to an 
agreement to cease conflict to set peace, but it does not mean that the rivalry will not recur. In 
terms of sport, relocation of a team or realignment in a division/conference can be an event that 
sometimes brings an end to enduring rivalries. For example, Seattle Seahawks and Denver 
Broncos in the NFL were once in the same AFC West division. However, they ended up being 
realigned to different divisions after 2002. This does not necessarily mean that the rivalry 
between them has ended, however, the chances of them meeting in the regular season and 
playoffs are none or relatively thin. Since the enduring rivalries specify that a minimum number 
of recurring conflicts or competitions should occur between rivals, it would be hard for the 
Seahawks and the Broncos to keep their rivalrous relationship. Moreover, competitiveness could 
be an imperative element in life cycle of enduring rivalries in sport. The importance of matches 
between rivalrous teams will fade away if one or the other team demonstrates on-field 
incompetence for years. Moreover, it is common to see how recent successful teams establish 
rivalries with other teams in sport.  
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Overall, what is important to derive from the idea of enduring rivalry in sport is that there 
needs to be a sufficient condition to establish such a relationship. Rivalry should have an 
objective that they compete for with animosity towards the other, although the specific objective 
can change as the time passes. One objective could be a divisional championship, for instance, 
while it could be transformed in to national championship over the course of time or as they 
reach the previous goal. Hatred could be established towards a rival who gets in the way of 
achieving the objective. Rivalry will ripen as the number of meetings increase given that 
recurring conflicts is one of the requirements of enduring rivalries, while having similar on-field 
competitiveness would be a necessary condition.  
Firm Rivalry 
 In strategic management research, firm rivalry is a significant topic that has been 
discussed for a long time. Although firms would not go to militarized conflicts, the competition 
among firms has clear strategic moves that ensure competitiveness in the market to restrain their 
rivals. Firms compete in different markets and segments so that multi-dimensional competition is 
common in business. Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985) offered one of the early attempts to 
conceptualize and theorize the topic of multiple point competition, which refers to “a situation 
where firms compete against each other simultaneously in several markets” for the same product. 
Moreover, it can be applied to a situation where firms compete in the same market but for 
different segments. One of the examples for multiple point competition is where firm A—the 
attacker—cuts the price of the products in one of the markets that they compete with firm B—the 
responder—where firm B should choose counteraction to firm A’s move. In general, firm B has 
four options for the responses as follows: disregard the action, respond in the market where firm 
A initiated attack, initiate a counterattack in another market where both firms compete, or go into 
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a total war in all the markets in which both firms compete. Although categorizing is useful for 
the three reactions besides doing nothing, they are not mutually exclusive or discrete; rather, the 
distinction is made in the degree of the action. Further, disregarding the attack will signal to the 
competing firm that the firm is weak, so that it is not an ideal option for the most of the cases. 
Hence, this is rarely an optimal choice if one does not wish to lose their influence in the market. 
Moreover, going into a total war will be too costly for both of the firms and even open the 
opportunity for third competitor enter the market. Hence, two strategies are the most viable 
options: first is to defend in the market where the other firm initiated the attack or second to 
counterattack in the other market where both firms compete.  
The competitions of firms can further explained with the idea of strategic group, which 
identifies an industry by clustering companies using similar strategies. According to Hatten and 
Hatten (1987), strategic group is “a grouping of organizations which pursue similar strategies 
with similar resources” and grouping is used to “segment industries into sets of companies whose 
competitors, actions and results are relevant to each other” (p. 329). That is, actions of firms 
within the same strategic group share reciprocal influence with each other and compete with 
resources that can be used for any of the firms within the group. Although the authors did not 
explicitly state that firms in these groups compete to achieve the same objectives, it is a 
reasonable inference to assume that firms have similar goals. In this way, it can be said that each 
sports league is a set of strategic groups since they compete with similar resources using similar 
strategies and share the same objectives. For instance, teams in the NFL tap into the same labor 
market of players, use similar techniques and strategies on-field, and all the teams pursue either a 
divisional championship or a national championship.  
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The follow up study of strategic groups and rivalry was done by Smith et al. (1997). They 
went further to investigate existence and level of intensity of rivalry within and between strategic 
groups. They found contradicting arguments around rivalry in between and within strategic 
groups. One argument is that firms within the same group share similar resources, suppliers, and 
customers so that there will be better communication and cooperation within group and intensity 
of rivalry will be lower. A mobility barrier, which is known as the entry barrier, is one of the key 
concepts of strategic group (González-Moreno & Sáez-Martínez, 2008). Such a barrier prevents 
new entry to the industry and therefore firms within a group have high incentives to put 
collective efforts to retain or enforce the barrier. In this sense, collusive behavior is highly 
possible within a strategic group to discourage outside competitors to enter into the industry. If 
this is true, there will be stronger rivalry between strategic groups since within group firms will 
have more propensities to cooperate.  
On the other hand, there is research arguing that cooperative behaviors in within groups 
are not affirmative so that a group is vulnerable to various factors such as number of competitors 
within a group or size of competitors (Smith et al., 1997). Hatten and Hatten (1987) is one of the 
researchers advocating that stronger rivalry will exist within a strategic group, since similarity of 
resource utilization enables firms to compete for market position more easily compared to 
competition with firms in different strategic groups. This is in the same vein as the resource-
based perspective, which suggests that rivalry will be intensified within a group when resources 
are homogeneous. This implies that firms will have similar strategies to achieve the same goal.  
Nevertheless, there is no consensus whether rivalry is intense between or within strategic 
groups. Smith et al. (1997) agreed to the idea of rivalry from Schumpeter (1950) and Porter 
 33 
 
(1980) who argued that there have to be actions and counteractions in rivalry. That is, rivalry can 
only be established in a sense that dyadic firms choose their moves and counter moves according 
to the other firm’s strategy. In this context, Smith et al. (1997) identified pairs of firms with 
actions and responses as strategic group members in the US airline industry. They tested actions 
and reactions of the US domestic airlines segmented into strategic groups in an 8-year period to 
assess inter-firm rivalry. Their results showed no significant implications directing which rivalry 
is more intense between and within groups.  
 In examining how an inter-firm rivalry starts, González-Moreno and Sáez-Martínez 
(2008) adopted a strategic group approach as a tool to analyze formation of firm rivalry. This 
research attempts to see whether strategic group analysis assists firms to be cognizant of industry 
and identify main rivals. The authors assumed rivalry as “a subjective and directional 
phenomenon” and they believe that rivalry occurs when a firm directs their focus and 
consideration of the other firm’s strategic decision. “Directional” in their assumption means that 
it is not necessarily true for a firm A, for instance, to identify firm B as their main rival despite 
whether firm B considers firm A as their main rival; therefore, establishing asymmetric strategic 
group rivalry. In addition, similarity is one important aspect of a firm to identify another firm as 
their main rival. This judgment of similarity, however, depends on the key decision maker, 
mostly the manager. Hence, identifying rivalry is subjective in a sense most of the cases are 
strongly influenced by decisions of the manager and the manager’s perception of similarity. In 
this context, first, the authors believe that there will be higher chance of forming a rivalry when 
perceived similarity with the targeted firm is greater. Secondly, they believe that firms that 
represent the strategic group structure of the industry have higher chances of being identified as 
rivals. The authors consent to the idea of Strategic Reference Point Theory (Fiegenbaum et al. 
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1996) which says that a manager takes members of its strategic group into account to formulate 
business strategies, therefore these members become the points of reference. Thirdly, the authors 
believe that firms with successful past performance will have greater chances to be identified as 
rivals. Due to the uncertain environment in the industry, most of the firms are likely to imitate 
strategies of successful firms. Lastly, the authors believe that there will be greater chances of 
being identified as a rival when the size of the firm is larger. Overall, the findings from their 
house building industry affirmed that all their beliefs were correct. In other words, firms with a 
higher perception of similarity, those that are within strategic group, and firms with past 
successful performance, and large sized firms are highly likely to be identified as rivals. In the 
context of sport, it can also be argued that teams with a similar history, those within the same 
division, and teams who have more championships and are known to be big teams are more 
likely to be identified as rivals.  
Rivalry in Fan Behavior 
“Basking in Reflected Glory” (BIRG) in sport implies to a phenomenon where sports 
fans tend to share success of their associated sports team and bolster the relationship (Cialdini et 
al., 1976). This is known as vicarious achievement, and they suggested that sports fans enjoy 
their team’s success and express their belonging publicly by wearing apparel or performing any 
kind of action that shows their affiliation although they never have had any physical contribution 
to that success. They examined students of seven universities that had a highly recognizable 
football team to see the effect. The result was in support of the assumption that more students 
wore apparel that indicated their connection after a recent football team victory, and they 
inferred that this is positively relevant to self-esteem. On the other hand, “Cutting off Reflected 
Failure” (CORF) implies to a phenomenon where fans tend to detach from their team due to the 
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reflected failures (Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, 1986). The authors argued that people will 
distance themselves from others’ failure to evade negative connection with them. They said that 
this can be seen as an “image-protection tactic,” which is to prevent their affiliation from being 
negatively assessed.  
Furthermore, Campbell Jr., Aiken, and Kent (2004) suggested that there is evidence of 
sports fans remaining attached with their team despite longitudinal failures, whereas others cut 
themselves off from the team or the player due to unethical successes, such as use of Physical 
Enhancing Drugs (PED) or unethical plays. The concepts they suggested are “Basking in Spite of 
Reflected Failure” (BIRF) and “Cutting off Reflected Success” (CORS). They claimed that 
BIRFing is related to loyalty and will persist as long as being loyal is perceived as a positive trait 
and enhances self-esteem. In other words, this phenomenon will be observed in diehard fans. For 
this kind of fans, CORFing is going against their beliefs, such as being loyal fans, so that it is 
also related to self-portrayal. Meanwhile, CORSing fans have a strong tendency to preserve 
consistency in value so that they are resistant to extreme changes in their team, or simply have 
affection towards underdogs so that winning might keep them away. Moreover, this behavior 
could be an exhibition of hatred towards fans who cut themselves off when a team is failing but 
return to bask in recent success.   
Conceptual Framework 
There is not yet a clear theoretical framework on how rivalry forms, develops, and affects 
demand in a sport context. Hence, with basis on the theoretical framework of Uncertainty of 
Outcome Hypothesis, I adopted a combination of applicable conceptual frameworks from other 
field of study to understand better consumption patterns of the NFL out-of-market games and to 
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see the rivalry as a central factor in the examination. First of all, unlike the findings of Tainsky 
(2010) and Tainsky and McEvoy (2012), rivalry would have a positive effect on the viewership 
demand within out-of-market games in respond to the competitiveness of the game compared to 
home market games due to the fact that affiliation and loyalty in this type of games are absent. 
Secondly, literature on enduring rivalry mainly gives an idea of how long-term rivalry is formed 
and what characteristics they share (Goertz & Diehl, 1993; Vasquez, 1996; Vasquez & Leskiw, 
2001). Rivals have to be closely competitive, a certain amount of repetitive competition should 
be guaranteed, and history involving animosity toward each other should be accompanied. From 
this context, teams with a relatively longer history will be more likely to develop rivalry 
compared to the teams that have a relatively shorter history since more competitions or conflicts 
should have happened compared to the younger teams. Thirdly, a strategic group model is most 
suitable in applying to the current NFL structure where divisional rivalries act as within strategic 
group rivalries (Hatten & Hatten, 1987; Smith et al., 1997; González-Moreno & Sáez-Martínez, 
2008). Teams in the league compete with compatible resources to each other in pursuit of the 
same goal. That is, teams within the same division are more likely to compete fiercely in on-field 
performance, in player labor market, and in procuring home fans. Moreover, it is clear that teams 
who share analogous history with more previous success and have been assigned to same 
division are more likely to be identified as rivals. Therefore, it is reasonable to apply strategic 
group theory as one of the frameworks in the divisional settings of the NFL. Lastly, similar to the 
BIRGing (Cialdini et al., 1976) and CORFing (Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, 1986) behavior of 
local market games, I believe that sports fans would rather see the rivals lose than win. Therefore, 
sports fans will tend to BIRF when their rival team is losing in out-of-market games and CORS 
when their rival team is winning (Campbell Jr., Aiken, & Kent, 2004). 
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CHAPTER III 
Research Methods 
Data and Procedures  
  To investigate rivalry effect in neutral markets, I first collected television viewership data 
of the NFL regular seasons from 2007 to 2009. The data represents all available Nielsen Local 
People Meter (LPM) markets. These data also include markets with no NFL franchises such as 
Los Angeles and Portland. The markets utilized in this thesis are those with at least one NFL 
franchise in order to see the effect of the rivalry since the affiliation of each market needs to be 
clearly identified. Therefore, the markets with NFL franchise included in the data set are: New 
York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Dallas, San Francisco, Boston, Atlanta, Washington DC, Houston, 
Detroit, Phoenix, Seattle, Minnesota, Miami, Cleveland, Denver, Saint Louis, Pittsburgh, 
Baltimore, Charlotte, and Tampa Bay. Then, the ratings were collected in 15-minute intervals. 
Since I am interested in the variation of viewership during the game, the following equation has 
been implemented:  
RatingsDrop = (RatingsPeak – RatingsLast) / RatingsPeak 
where the RatingsPeak denotes the maximum rating for any interval within a game and RatingsLast 
denotes the final rating for each game. The RatingsDrop captures the viewership loss from the 
maximum number of viewers who tuned in for any interval to the viewers watching in the final 
interval for each game. If the RatingsDrop’s value is zero, there is no viewership lost within the 
game. This is also a case where RatingsPeak equals RatingsLast. Otherwise, the value of this 
equation takes a positive, non-zero value maximizing at one.  
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 For the next step, the markets were divided into three categories: Winning, Losing, and 
Neutral. The winning market is where home team has won the game while Losing is the opposite. 
In other words, if team A defeated team B, team A’s market will constitute the Winning market, 
team B’s market the losing market, and all other cities that broadcasted the game will fall under 
the category of Neutral market. To illustrate how the data were treated, on September 9
th
, 2008, 
the Browns played Steelers. The Final score was 7 to 34 with the Steelers winning the game. The 
peak rating for Pittsburgh—the winning market—was 40.2 and final rating was 39.6, yielding a 
Ratings Drop of 0.015. The peak rating for Cleveland—the losing market—was 35.1 and final 
rating was 26.7, yielding a Ratings Drop of 0.239. This game was also shown in Baltimore—the 
neutral market—where the peak rating was 9.1 and final rating was 4.2, yielding a Ratings Drop 
of 0.538 
Analysis 
 In the previous study of Sung et al. (2014, May), they found out statistical evidence of the 
winning market showing a lower viewership ratings drop over all the score intervals compared to 
losing and neutral markets, while losing and neutral markets showed no statistical difference in 
viewership pattern in the NFL regular season from 2008 to 2009. The data for this thesis was 
collected in a same way but from 2007 to 2009 of the NFL regular season. Following is the 
summary of statistics of ratings drops according to the market type and each market. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Ratings Drop according to Market Type and LPM Markets 
Market Mean Standard Deviation Median Min Max Obs 
Winning 0.045 0.075 0.007 0.000 0.508 516 
Losing 0.130 0.135 0.099 0.000 0.654 545 
Neutral 0.145 0.145 0.105 0.000 0.657 629 
NY 0.195 0.187 0.182 0.000 0.744 183 
LA 0.128 0.146 0.079 0.000 0.556 296 
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As it was revealed in the previous study of Sung et al. (2014, May), the average ratings show that 
winning market were more likely to stay tuned despite the increased score differences while 
there was higher drop off in ratings of losing and neutral markets. Nevertheless, this study has 
not considered the characteristics of each game such as divisional games. Therefore, there will be 
difference within the neutral market category by using divisional games to identify its effect on 
the viewership demand. In this sense, the first null hypothesis for this study is as follows:  
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Ratings Drop according to Market Type and LPM Markets (cont.) 
Market Mean Standard Deviation Median Min Max Obs 
CH 0.166 0.184 0.104 0.000 0.778 237 
PH 0.168 0.175 0.120 0.000 0.694 239 
DL 0.143 0.160 0.093 0.000 0.718 249 
SF 0.132 0.150 0.067 0.000 0.550 182 
BN 0.228 0.213 0.189 0.000 0.878 238 
AT 0.171 0.176 0.115 0.000 0.729 241 
DC 0.161 0.171 0.109 0.000 0.709 235 
HN 0.169 0.169 0.126 0.000 0.792 217 
DE 0.191 0.182 0.152 0.000 0.727 234 
PX 0.137 0.152 0.076 0.000 0.619 241 
SE 0.164 0.168 0.121 0.000 0.824 235 
MN 0.191 0.200 0.137 0.000 0.765 235 
MI 0.179 0.170 0.146 0.000 0.644 229 
CL 0.212 0.199 0.172 0.000 0.863 231 
DV 0.159 0.179 0.090 0.000 0.677 238 
OR 0.180 0.185 0.128 0.000 0.733 292 
SM 0.132 0.145 0.087 0.000 0.613 293 
SL 0.139 0.158 0.094 0.000 0.680 238 
PT 0.211 0.204 0.169 0.000 0.833 234 
PD 0.142 0.159 0.076 0.000 0.909 296 
BL 0.176 0.171 0.138 0.000 0.689 233 
CT 0.217 0.195 0.176 0.000 0.720 233 
TP 0.206 0.194 0.187 0.000 0.786 232 
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Hypothesis 1: The ratings drop of neutral market games with a divisional team will be 
equal to that of neutral market games without a divisional team.  
H0 : RatingsDropNd = RatingsDropNn  
where Nd represents neutral market games with divisional teams while Nn represents neutral 
market games with non-divisional teams. The following table is the summary of statistics for the 
data: 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Ratings Drop in Nd and Nn 
Market Mean Standard Deviation Median Min Max Obs 
Nd 0.165 0.166 0.123 0.000 0.625 728 
Nn 0.180 0.185 0.131 0.000 0.878 3919 
 
Furthermore, I believe that sports fans will respond to the neutral market games with 
divisional teams differently than they will to their home team games. In lieu of BIRGing when 
their team is winning while CORFing when their team is losing, sports fans will BIRF when their 
rival team is losing and CORS when their rival team is winning (Campbell Jr., Aiken, & Kent, 
2004). In other words, sports fans will be more likely to watch divisional team losing rather than 
winning. Moreover, I expect that the pattern of neutral market games with divisional team 
winning will resemble that of losing market while the pattern of neutral market games with 
divisional team losing will resemble that of winning market. Hence, the second null hypotheses 
are as follows:  
Hypothesis 2-A: The ratings drop of neutral market games with divisional team winning 
will be equal to that of home losing market games. 
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H0: RatingsDropNdw = RatingsDropL; 
Hypothesis 2-B: The ratings drop of neutral market games with divisional team losing 
will be equal to that of home winning market games.  
H0: RatingsDropNdl = RatingDropW  
where Ndw represents a neutral market game with divisional team winning while Ndl represents 
neutral market game with divisional team losing, and W and L each represent the winning market 
and losing market, respectively. Nn represents neutral market games with non-divisional team 
playing from all the markets. The summary of statistics of Ndw, Ndl, and Nn is as follows: 
Table 3. Summary Statistics of Ratings Drop in Ndw, Ndl, and Nn 
Market Mean Standard Deviation Median Min Max Obs 
Ndw 0.182 0.170 0.140 0.000 0.614 380 
Ndl 0.146 0.159 0.087 0.000 0.625 348 
Nn 0.180 0.185 0.131 0.000 0.878 3919 
 
I then have set the data according to the score interval. One of the most common ways to 
score in football game is by field goal and its three points. Hence, I first created ten 3 points 
intervals with an interval of margins 30 and over. Following is the result of the average ratings 
drop of each market type in accordance with the score intervals (Figure 2). Nevertheless, there 
was unexpected inconsistency within the data, likely due to the small sample size within each 
interval (Table 4). Therefore, I then reorganized the data using 6 points intervals (Figure 3).  
The New York market and the San Francisco market each have two NFL franchises (i.e., 
the Giants and Jets in New York, the 49ers and the Raiders in San Francisco) and the viewership 
of each team is consolidated in Nielsen Local People Meter (LPM) market data, which makes it 
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difficult to see which ratings representing which team. Therefore, further analysis omits these 
markets to avoid confusion within the data, and renamed the market types to be Ndw2, Ndl2, and 
Nn2. Table 5 is the summary statistics of the data without the New York and San Francisco 
markets and Figure 4 & 5 is the ratings drop according to 3 point intervals and 6 point intervals.  
 
Table 4. Number of Observations in Each Interval according to Market Type 
  0-2 3-5 6-8 9-11 12-14 15-17 18-20 21-23 24-26 27-29 30+ 
Ndw 18 68 61 47 32 19 42 29 20 14 30 
Ndl 27 80 51 38 25 19 28 30 15 9 26 
Nn 260 966 718 397 263 241 267 294 145 89 279 
Ndw2 15 59 54 39 26 17 35 27 16 12 27 
Ndl2 25 71 44 32 24 16 24 26 13 7 23 
Nn2 244 900 675 372 244 226 250 279 139 86 263 
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics of Ratings Drop in Ndw2, Ndl2, and Nn2 
Market Mean Standard Deviation Median Min Max Obs 
Ndw2 0.178 0.167 0.134 0.000 0.614 327 
Ndl2 0.144 0.158 0.083 0.000 0.625 305 
Nn2 0.182 0.186 0.133 0.000 0.878 3678 
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Figure 2. Average ratings drop of each market types with 3 points score intervals 
 
 
Figure 3. Average ratings drop of each market types with 6 points score intervals 
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Figure 4. Average ratings drop of each market types with 3 points score intervals without 
NY and SF 
 
 
Figure 5. Average ratings drop of each market types with 6 points score intervals without 
NY and SF 
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After organizing these analyses according to the score intervals, I reorganized the data to 
run regression analysis to understand further determinants of the ratings drop. The general linear 
model for each game i in market type j follows as: 
RatingsDropi,j = β1TotalLagWinPcti,j + β2WinPctDiffi,j + β3AgeDiffi,j + β4DivAgeDiffi,j + 
β5Regionali,j + β6Distancei,j + β7Rivalryi,j + β8ScoreMargini,j + β9ScoreMargin
2
i,j + εi,j  
Moreover, further regression analysis was performed in each market and in each division 
to see the divisional effect. The general linear model for each game i in market k follows as:  
RatingsDropi,k = β1TotalLagWinPcti,k + β2WinPctDiffi,k + β3AgeDiffi,k + β4DivAgeDiffi,k + 
β5Regionali,k + β6Distancei,k + β7Rivalryi,k + β8ScoreMargini,k + β9ScoreMargin
2
i,k + 
β10Divisionali,k + εi,k  
The RatingsDrop is a dependent variable that captures the viewership loss of each game, 
measured by the equation in the previous page. Paul and Weinbach (2007) have included the sum 
of winning percentage as an independent variable to see the expected quality of the game in their 
study of Monday Night Football. They argued that winning percentage is in positive relation 
with the quality of the game. Thus, the TotalLagWinPct variable is in the same context to capture 
the expected quality of a game. On the other hand, the WinPctDiff is the absolute value of 
winning percent difference between home and away teams in the current season which captures 
the expected competitiveness of each game so that a smaller value indicates more 
competitiveness and close games.  
The AgeDiff variable indicates the age gap between home and away teams while 
DivAgeDiff variable indicates the age gap between teams being placed in their division. These 
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variables are in same context of enduring rivalries of Goertz and Diehl (1993), Vasquez and 
Leskiw (2001), and within strategic group rivalry theory of González-Moreno and Sáez-Martínez 
(2008) in a sense that history and age of teams are highly relevant to the rivalry. Each divisional 
age of home and away teams was calculated by how long a team was staying in the division and 
from the time they were founded to each season of 2007 through 2009 accordingly. However, the 
years are only calculated for the years that they have spent in same location as same franchise. In 
other words, if a team was relocated and came back to original location or if a team had periods 
where they ceased to operate, those years are not counted into the age of the teams. In one case, 
NFL Central Division was renamed NFC North, so that teams who belong in this division were 
calculated from the years they started to play in the Central division. However, in the cases such 
as teams being  realigned from AFC West to AFC South or changing their conference were 
calculated from the current division since realignment brings whole different settings to the 
division. Moreover, for the St. Louis Rams, since they were the Los Angeles Rams until 1994, 
their age for 2007 regular season is 12 years but their presence in the NFC West was counted 
from 1970 so that their divisional age is 37 years. That is, although teams relocate or change 
their names but stayed in same division, then they will be considered as the same team.  
The Regional variable is a dummy variable which denotes the games where teams from 
the same state are playing. Although current divisional alignment of the NFL gives relatively 
weak significance to the games between teams in the same state but different division, it can be 
said that locality of teams could have some influence in viewership patterns. The Distance 
variable is the distance between each team’s stadium to stadium. This variable is in similar 
context with the Regional variable in a sense that proximity of each team will have effect on the 
interest of the games. The Rivalry variable is a dummy for the games with teams that were 
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identified as a rival in the contextual setting section (e.g., 1 for rival teams). If a game is between 
well-known rivalry, it is likely that viewers will be more interested in these games compared to 
other neutral market games. The ScoreMargin variable is to see how ratings drops correspond to 
the competitiveness and linear trend at the same time. Following the UOH, the interest in the 
game will decrease as the score difference increases since a larger margin indicates less 
competiveness. 
Then, I separated the data according to each market with local teams to explain the 
divisional effect on rivalry. For these data, the Divisional dummy variable was added for the 
games that have at least one of the divisional teams (e.g., 1 for one divisional team playing, 2 for 
games against two divisional teams) in accordance to the market divisional affiliation. Previously, 
Tainsky and Jasielec (2014) found that the average ratings for the out-of-market games in the 
NFL increased when the division or conference teams were featured. Therefore, this variable is 
to capture the effect of the divisional rivalries as in the similar context but measuring within 
game change rather than static average. Table 6 shows all the variables that are used in this 
research and its definition. 
Table 6. Definition of Variables 
Variables Description 
Nd Neutral market games with divisional team 
Ndw Neutral market games with divisional team winning 
Ndl Neutral market games with divisional team losing 
Nn Neutral market games with non-divisional team 
Nd2 Neutral market games with divisional team without NY and SF 
Ndw2 Neutral market games with divisional team winning without NY and SF 
Ndl2 Neutral market games with divisional team losing without NY and SF 
Nn2 Neutral market games with non-divisional team without NY and SF 
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Table 6. Definition of Variables (cont.) 
Variables Description 
TotalLagWinPct Sum of previous season winning percentage of home and away team 
WinPctDiff 
Absolute value of winning percent difference between home and away teams in the 
current season 
AgeDiff Difference between age of home and away teams 
DivAgeDiff Difference between divisional age of home and away teams 
Regional Dummy variable for the games where teams from the same state are playing 
Distance Distance between each team’s stadium to stadium 
Rivalry Dummy variable for the rival teams identified in the contextual setting section 
ScoreMargin End score difference of each game  
ScoreMargin
2
 Squared end score difference of each game 
Divisional 
Dummy variable for the games with at least one of the divisional teams (e.g., 1 for 
one divisional team playing, 2 for games against two divisional teams) 
 
Results 
Hypothesis 1 
 To test the difference within the neutral market according to the divisional games, I ran a 
pairwise comparison ANOVA with SAS 9.3. As noted earlier, the New York and San Francisco 
markets are omitted in all the following analyses. The result of the hypothesis 1 is as shown in 
the Table 7. The result shows that there exists difference between the neutral market games with 
divisional team and neutral market games without divisional team although it was only 0.02 
differences in average ratings drop. This is in support of my first hypothesis that there will be 
some significance of rivalry in the out-of-market game preference of sports fans. In other words, 
sports fans perceive out-of-market game with divisional teams as more interesting than truly 
neutral market games.  
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Table 7. Comparison of Nd2 to Nn2 
Market type 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means Simultaneous 95% Confidence Limits  
Nd2 – Nn2 0.020 0.005 0.035 *** 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level are indicated by ***. 
 
Moreover, I ran a pairwise ANOVA analysis comparing neutral market games with 
divisional teams and neutral market games with non-divisional teams across the range score 
intervals defined earlier (Table 8).  
Table 8. Comparison of ND and NN according to Score Interval 
Score  
Interval 
Market Type 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
Interval 0-2 Nd2 – Nn2 0.015 -0.019 0.050  
Interval 3-5 Nd2 – Nn2 -0.029 -0.054 -0.005 *** 
Interval 6-8 Nd2 – Nn2 -0.016 -0.045 0.013  
Interval 9-11 Nd2 – Nn2 -0.020 -0.060 0.021  
Interval 12-14 Nd2 – Nn2 -0.080 -0.129 -0.030 *** 
Interval 15-17 Nd2 – Nn2 0.014 -0.045 0.074  
Interval 18-20 Nd2 – Nn2 -0.077 -0.128 -0.027 *** 
Interval 21-23 Nd2 – Nn2 0.003 -0.049 0.055  
Interval 24-26 Nd2 – Nn2 -0.087 -0.155 -0.018 *** 
Interval 27-29 Nd2 – Nn2 -0.183 -0.296 -0.071 *** 
Interval 30+ Nd2 – Nn2 -0.020 -0.080 0.040  
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level are indicated by ***. 
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The result indicates that there were differences only in certain intervals (e.g., intervals of 
3-5, 12-14, 18-20, 24-26, 27-29) with no clear pattern emergence. That is, despite the presence of 
statistical differences between neutral market games with divisional teams and neutral market 
games with non-divisional teams, it is unclear at which point that they show consistency in the 
pattern of ratings drop.  
Hypothesis 2 
I have also ran pairwise comparison ANOVA with SAS 9.3 to see whether there is 
difference in ratings drop of divisional neutral market winning games to that of losing market 
games, and difference in the ratings drop of divisional neutral market losing games to that of 
winning market games. The base assumption here is from the previous study of Sung et al. (2014, 
May), which found out that the winning market shows less drop off in ratings compared to losing 
and neutral markets. That is, the winning market tends to BIRG while losing and neutral market 
tends to CORF. The result of the hypothesis 2-A and 2-B are as shown in the Table 9. 
Table 9. Comparison of Ndw2 and Ndl2 to W and L 
Market Type 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means Simultaneous 95% Confidence Limits  
Ndw2 - W 0.134 0.101 0.167 *** 
Ndw2 - L 0.048 0.016 0.081 *** 
Ndl2 - W 0.010 0.066 0.133 *** 
Ndl2 - L 0.014 -0.019 0.048  
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level are indicated by ***. 
The comparison of average ratings drop of neutral market games with divisional team winning 
showed that they were statistically different from both winning and losing market. This indicates 
that fans watching neutral market games with divisional team winning did not resemble the 
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CORFing patterns of the losing market or CORSing, which does not support the hypothesis 2-A. 
Moreover, the comparison of neutral market games with divisional team losing to winning 
market showed statistical difference. This also does not support the hypothesis 2-B in way that 
fans watching neutral market games with divisional team losing did not resemble the BIRGing 
patterns of winning market or BIRFing. Nevertheless, neutral market games with divisional team 
losing and losing market showed statistical similarity in average ratings drop. In other words, 
sports fans tend to CORF when their rival team is losing which is analogous to the behavior 
when their affiliated team is losing.  
 Further, I also ran pairwise comparison ANOVA of neutral market game with divisional 
team winning and losing, winning market games, and losing market games according to 3 points 
score interval. Following Table is the result of the analysis. 
Table 10. Comparison of Ndw and Ndl to W and L according to Score Intervals 
 
Score Intervals Market Type 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
Interval 
0-2 
W – L 0.008 -0.057 0.072  
Ndw2 – Ndl2    0.054 -0.031 0.139  
Ndw2 – W  0.070 -0.011 0.151  
Ndw2 – L  0.078 -0.005 0.160  
Ndl2 – W  0.016 -0.053 0.085  
Ndl2 – L  0.024 -0.046 0.094  
Interval 
3-5 
W – L -0.019 -0.065 0.026  
Ndw2 – Ndl2    0.034 -0.027 0.094  
Ndw2 – W  0.058 0.002 0.113 *** 
Ndw2 – L  0.038 -0.017 0.093  
Ndl2 – W  0.024 -0.029 0.076  
Ndl2 – L  0.004 -0.047 0.056  
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Table 10. Comparison of Ndw and Ndl to W and L according to Score Intervals (cont.) 
 
Score Intervals Market Type 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits 
 
Interval 
6-8 
 
W – L -0.033 -0.083 0.016  
Ndw2 – Ndl2    0.036 -0.033 0.106  
Ndw2 – W  0.091 0.033 0.149 *** 
Ndw2 – L  0.058 -0.000 0.116  
Ndl2 – W  0.055 -0.007 0.117  
Ndl2 – L  0.022 -0.040 0.084  
Interval 
9-11 
W – L -0.072 -0.150 0.006  
Ndw2 – Ndl2    0.046 -0.050 0.143  
Ndw2 – W  0.143 0.058 0.229 *** 
Ndw2 – L  0.071 -0.013 0.156  
Ndl2 – W  0.097 0.006 0.188 *** 
Ndl2 – L  0.025 -0.065 0.115  
Interval 
12-14 
W – L -0.120 -0.201 -0.040 *** 
Ndw2 – Ndl2    -0.032 -0.147 0.082  
Ndw2 – W  0.103 0.005 0.201 *** 
Ndw2 – L  -0.017 -0.115 0.080  
Ndl2 – W  0.136 0.035 0.236 *** 
Ndl2 – L  0.015 -0.085 0.115  
Interval 
15-17 
W – L -0.133 -0.240 -0.025 *** 
Ndw2 – Ndl2    -0.031 -0.176 0.113  
Ndw2 – W  0.212 0.087 0.336 *** 
Ndw2 – L  0.079 -0.048 0.207  
Ndl2 – W  0.243 0.116 0.370 *** 
Ndl2 – L  0.110 -0.020 0.240  
Interval 
18-20 
W – L -0.177 -0.291 -0.062 *** 
Ndw2 – Ndl2    0.003 -0.121 0.126  
Ndw2 – W  0.139 0.023 0.255 *** 
Ndw2 – L  -0.038 -0.148 0.072  
Ndl2 – W  0.136 0.009 0.264 *** 
Ndl2 – L  -0.040 -0.163 0.082  
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Table 10. Comparison of Ndw and Ndl to W and L according to Score Intervals (cont.) 
 
Score Intervals Market Type 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits 
 
Interval 
21-23 
W – L -0.177 -0.280 -0.075 *** 
Ndw2 – Ndl2    0.027 -0.097 0.152  
Ndw2 – W  0.226 0.111 0.341 *** 
Ndw2 – L  0.049 -0.063 0.160  
Ndl2 – W  0.198 0.082 0.315 *** 
Ndl2 – L  0.021 -0.092 0.134  
Interval 
24-26 
W – L -0.148 -0.269 -0.026 *** 
Ndw2 – Ndl2    0.031 -0.130 0.193  
Ndw2 – W  0.159 0.019 0.299 *** 
Ndw2 – L  0.011 -0.124 0.146  
Ndl2 – W  0.128 -0.022 0.277  
Ndl2 – L  -0.020 -0.165 0.125  
Interval 
27-29 
W – L -0.150 -0.319 0.019  
Ndw2 – Ndl2    0.058 -0.205 0.321  
Ndw2 – W  0.163 -0.034 0.360  
Ndw2 – L  0.013 -0.189 0.215  
Ndl2 – W  0.105 -0.133 0.344  
Ndl2 – L  -0.045 -0.287 0.198  
Interval 
30+ 
W – L -0.157 -0.277 -0.036 *** 
Ndw2 – Ndl2    0.004 -0.140 0.148  
Ndw2 – W  0.213 0.081 0.344 *** 
Ndw2 – L  0.056 -0.072 0.183  
Ndl2 – W  0.208 0.071 0.346 *** 
Ndl2 – L  0.052 -0.082 0.185  
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level are indicated by ***. 
Although there was no statistical difference of ratings drop in all the markets in interval of 0-2, 
the result shows that Ndw2 shows significant difference from winning market in all of the 
intervals except 27-29 while Ndl2 shows significant difference from the winning market in 
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intervals of 9-11, 12-14, 15-17, 18-20, and 21-23. In other words, the ratings drop of neutral 
market games with the divisional team winning is statistically different than BIRGing pattern of 
winning market games from 3 points up while the neutral market with the divisional team losing 
showed statistical difference from 8 points up, except in intervals of 24-26 and 27-29. Therefore, 
it can be said that the fans watching out-of-market games are more responsive to the 
competitiveness of the game when their divisional team is winning. The most reasonable 
explanation of no statistical difference between all market in the interval of 27-29 is due to the 
relatively small sample size (refer to Table 4). However, there was no statistical difference 
between the neutral market with divisional team winning and losing.  
Regression Analysis 
 The following tables are the result of the regression analysis of winning, losing, and 
neutral markets (Table 11-1, 11-2, 11-3). 
Table 11-1. Regression Analysis of Winning Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -0.99 -0.016 
TotalLagWinPct 1.70 0.020* 
WinPctDiff -2.77 -0.023*** 
AgeDiff 0.34 0.000 
DivAgeDiff -1.55 -0.000 
Regional -0.41 -0.012 
Distance 0.71 0.000 
Rivalry 0.43 0.004 
ScoreMargin 3.96 0.004*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -1.31 -0.000 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .1348. 
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Table 11-2. Regression Analysis of Losing Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -2.53 -0.059** 
TotalLagWinPct 0.94 0.016 
WinPctDiff -1.20 -0.014 
AgeDiff 0.99 0.000 
DivAgeDiff -0.02 -0.000 
Regional -0.40 -0.012 
Distance 1.58 0.000 
Rivalry 0.93 0.012 
ScoreMargin 10.76 0.017*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -5.56 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .4149. 
 
 
Table 11-3. Regression Analysis of Neutral Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -2.10 -0.051** 
TotalLagWinPct 2.69 0.046*** 
WinPctDiff -2.38 -0.028** 
AgeDiff 0.55 0.000 
DivAgeDiff 0.39 0.000 
Regional 0.17 0.006 
Distance 0.10 0.000 
Rivalry 0.72 0.010 
ScoreMargin 10.28 0.014*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -4.63 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3685. 
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The variables included explain 13.48 % of the winning market while it explains 41.49 % of the 
losing market and 36.85% of neutral market. Variables displaying significance in the winning 
market are TotalLagWinPct, WinPctDiff, and ScoreMargin, which has the closest relevance to 
the uncertainty and competitiveness of the game. These variables indicated that the ratings drop 
increased as sum of the previous season winning percentages of both team increased and as score 
margin increased, while ratings drop decreased as the winning percent difference increased 
ceteris paribus. Moreover, the winning market shows a linear trend but does not show quadratic 
trend. Significant variables both in losing market neutral market were shown in ScoreMargin and 
ScoreMargin
2
, which indicates that ratings drop increase as the game become less competitive 
and there is a quadratic trend in ratings drop. However, neutral market showed significance in 
TotalLagWinPct and WinPctDiff. Increased winning percentage difference between two teams 
have decreased ratings drop as winning market; however, increase in expected game quality 
increased ratings drop.  
 To see what motivates NFL consumers to watch neutral market games, regression 
analysis of each market including Divisional variable were performed for further understanding 
of market characteristics along with the rivalry effect. 
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Table 12-1. Regression Analysis of Chicago Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -2.139 -0.110** 
TotalLagWinPct 0.738 0.027 
WinPctDiff -1.34 -0.030 
AgeDiff 0.792 0.000 
DivAgeDiff 0.110 0.000 
Regional 0.166 0.012 
Distance 1.943 0.000* 
Rivalry 1.196 0.029 
Divisional -2.289 -0.048** 
ScoreMargin 8.770 0.022*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -4.798 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .4686. 
 
Table 12-2. Regression Analysis of Philadelphia Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -0.578 -0.030 
TotalLagWinPct 0.936 0.034 
WinPctDiff -2.084 -0.047** 
AgeDiff -0.478 -0.000 
DivAgeDiff -0.477 -0.000 
Regional 0.309 0.020 
Distance -0.357 -0.000 
Rivalry 1.494 0.035 
Divisional -0.349 -0.006 
ScoreMargin 5.700 0.016*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -2.375 -0.000** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3820. 
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Table 12-3. Regression Analysis of Dallas Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept 1.660 0.090* 
TotalLagWinPct -1.385 -0.055 
WinPctDiff -0.739 -0.016 
AgeDiff -1.077 -0.001 
DivAgeDiff 0.175 0.000 
Regional -1.335 -0.092 
Distance 0.385 0.000 
Rivalry -0.967 -0.023 
Divisional -1.140 -0.018 
ScoreMargin 6.384 0.016*** 
ScoreMargin2 -4.048 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .2799. 
 
Table 12-4. Regression Analysis of Boston Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -0.120 -0.009 
TotalLagWinPct 0.641 0.034 
WinPctDiff -2.528 -0.076** 
AgeDiff 0.557 0.000 
DivAgeDiff -0.854 -0.001 
Regional -0.600 -0.075 
Distance -1.026 -0.000 
Rivalry 1.744 0.054* 
Divisional -1.611 -0.044 
ScoreMargin 5.736 0.024*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -3.188 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3611. 
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Table 12-5. Regression Analysis of Atlanta Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -0.766 -0.043 
TotalLagWinPct 1.110 0.043 
WinPctDiff -1.993 -0.050** 
AgeDiff -0.615 -0.000 
DivAgeDiff -0.761 -0.001 
Regional -0.000 -0.000 
Distance 0.397 0.000 
Rivalry 0.442 0.011 
Divisional 1.216 0.036 
ScoreMargin 7.502 0.019*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -5.009 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3079. 
 
Table 12-6. Regression Analysis of Washington D.C. Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept 1.132 0.067 
TotalLagWinPct -0.564 -0.024 
WinPctDiff -1.033 -0.026 
AgeDiff 0.335 0.000 
DivAgeDiff -1.766 -0.001* 
Regional 1.290 0.109 
Distance -0.126 -0.000 
Rivalry 0.139 0.004 
Divisional -0.944 -0.015 
ScoreMargin 4.356 0.014*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -1.725 -0.000* 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .2942. 
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Table 12-7. Regression Analysis of Houston Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept 0.446 0.027 
TotalLagWinPct -0.328 -0.015 
WinPctDiff -2.078 -0.054** 
AgeDiff -1.340 -0.001 
DivAgeDiff 0.133 0.000 
Regional 0.552 0.078 
Distance 1.879 0.000* 
Rivalry 0.287 0.007 
Divisional -1.161 -0.026 
ScoreMargin 5.354 0.017*** 
ScoreMargin
2 
-3.273 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .2853. 
 
Table 12-8. Regression Analysis of Detroit Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -0.498 -0.019 
TotalLagWinPct 1.602 0.044 
WinPctDiff -0.818 -0.015 
AgeDiff -0.078 -0.000 
DivAgeDiff -1.164 -0.001 
Regional 1.133 0.067 
Distance -0.974 -0.000 
Rivalry -0.588 -0.010 
Divisional -1.364 -0.019 
ScoreMargin 11.705 0.021*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -6.746 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3884. 
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Table 12-9. Regression Analysis of Phoenix Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -1.690 -0.078* 
TotalLagWinPct 1.289 0.044 
WinPctDiff -0.760 -0.016 
AgeDiff -0.864 -0.000 
DivAgeDiff 1.206 0.001 
Regional 0.943 0.060 
Distance 0.122 0.000 
Rivalry 1.551 0.033 
Divisional 1.109 0.034 
ScoreMargin 8.071 0.018*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -4.809 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3805. 
 
 
Table 12-10. Regression Analysis of Seattle Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept 0.569 0.033 
TotalLagWinPct -0.185 -0.008 
WinPctDiff 0.9533 0.026 
AgeDiff -0.405 -0.000 
DivAgeDiff -0.202 -0.000 
Regional -0.942 -0.075 
Distance -0.157 -0.000 
Rivalry 0.492 0.014 
Divisional 0.345 0.012 
ScoreMargin 5.648 0.019*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -3.792 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .2248. 
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Table 12-11. Regression Analysis of Minnesota Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -0.181 -0.010 
TotalLagWinPct 0.964 0.039 
WinPctDiff -0.655 -0.017 
AgeDiff 0.736 0.000 
DivAgeDiff -1.722 -0.002* 
Regional -1.065 -0.083 
Distance -1.286 -0.000 
Rivalry -0.665 -0.017 
Divisional -2.069 -0.046** 
ScoreMargin 6.851 0.019*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -3.164 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .4147. 
 
Table 12-12. Regression Analysis of Miami Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept 0.114 0.006 
TotalLagWinPct 0.388 0.016 
WinPctDiff -0.856 -0.022 
AgeDiff -0.247 -0.000 
DivAgeDiff 0.296 0.000 
Regional -0.136 -0.014 
Distance 0.627 0.000 
Rivalry 0.185 0.005 
Divisional -1.691 -0.036* 
ScoreMargin 4.905 0.015*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -1.693 -0.000* 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3621. 
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Table 12-13. Regression Analysis of Cleveland Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -1.038 -0.064 
TotalLagWinPct 0.963 0.045 
WinPctDiff -0.190 -0.006 
AgeDiff 0.202 0.000 
DivAgeDiff 0.996 0.001 
Regional -0.492 -0.082 
Distance 1.526 0.000 
Rivalry 0.931 0.028 
Divisional -1.391 -0.030 
ScoreMargin 6.854 0.021*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -3.952 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3360. 
 
Table 12-14. Regression Analysis of Denver Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept 0.250 0.014 
TotalLagWinPct -0.172 -0.007 
WinPctDiff -1.948 -0.050* 
AgeDiff 0.071 0.000 
DivAgeDiff -0.982 -0.001 
Regional 0.083 0.009 
Distance 0.666 0.000 
Rivalry -0.424 -0.011 
Divisional -1.526 -0.037 
ScoreMargin 6.596 0.017*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -3.295 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3654. 
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Table 12-15. Regression Analysis of St. Louis Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -1.226 -0.059 
TotalLagWinPct 1.793 0.061* 
WinPctDiff -0.477 -0.011 
AgeDiff -1.214 -0.001 
DivAgeDiff -1.080 -0.001 
Regional 1.847 0.167* 
Distance 0.302 0.000 
Rivalry 1.202 0.027 
Divisional 0.426 0.011 
ScoreMargin 6.376 0.014*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -3.416 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3317. 
 
Table 12-16. Regression Analysis of Pittsburgh Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -0.258 -0.018 
TotalLagWinPct 0.996 0.051 
WinPctDiff -1.918 -0.060* 
AgeDiff 0.716 0.001 
DivAgeDiff 0.521 0.001 
Regional 0.340 0.034 
Distance -1.087 -0.000 
Rivalry 1.333 0.046 
Divisional -1.960 -0.051* 
ScoreMargin 5.404 0.018*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -3.088 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .2627. 
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Table 12-17. Regression Analysis of Baltimore Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept 0.828 0.046 
TotalLagWinPct -0.174 -0.007 
WinPctDiff -2.328 -0.056** 
AgeDiff -0.146 -0.000 
DivAgeDiff 0.992 0.001 
Regional 1.699 0.129* 
Distance -0.796 -0.000 
Rivalry 0.658 0.017 
Divisional -2.592 -0.050** 
ScoreMargin 6.342 0.016*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -3.445 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3470. 
 
Table 12-18. Regression Analysis of Charlotte Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -0.677 -0.047 
TotalLagWinPct 1.421 0.069 
WinPctDiff -0.903 -0.028 
AgeDiff 1.588 0.001 
DivAgeDiff -0.839 -0.001 
Regional -0.137 -0.012 
Distance -0.834 -0.000 
Rivalry 1.138 0.033 
Divisional 1.276 0.041 
ScoreMargin 5.466 0.021*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -3.533 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .2344. 
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Table 12-19. Regression Analysis of Tampa Bay Market 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -0.470 -0.029 
TotalLagWinPct 1.323 0.056 
WinPctDiff -1.365 -0.039 
AgeDiff 0.693 0.000 
DivAgeDiff -2.334 -0.002** 
Regional 1.018 0.118 
Distance -0.441 -0.000 
Rivalry 0.287 0.008 
Divisional 1.523 0.041 
ScoreMargin 5.217 0.019*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -2.809 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3094. 
 
The result is consistent with the neutral market regression analysis in that all the markets show 
significance in ScoreMargin and ScoreMargin
2
 variable. Beside these variables, each market 
displayed significance in other variables except a few markets (e.g., Detroit, Seattle, Cleveland, 
and Charlotte). TotalLagWinPct only showed significance in St. Louis market; however, it 
indicated increase in ratings drop as the sum of winning percentage of both team increased. 
WinPctDiff displayed significance in Philadelphia, Boston, Atlanta, Houston, Denver, Pittsburgh, 
and Baltimore market, indicating a lower ratings drop as competing teams’ current season 
winning percent difference increased. DivAgeDiff displayed significance in the Washington D.C., 
Minnesota, and Tampa Bay markets, indicating a lower ratings drop as divisional age difference 
of the two teams playing increased. Regional displayed significance in the St. Louis and 
Baltimore markets, indicating a higher ratings drop when teams from the same state are playing. 
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Distance displayed significance in the Chicago and Houston markets, indicating a higher ratings 
drop as distance between competing teams increased. Rivalry displayed significance only in 
Boston market, indicating a higher ratings drop when well-known rivals are playing. Lastly, 
Divisional displayed significance in the Chicago, Boston, Minnesota, Miami, Pittsburgh, and 
Baltimore markets, indicating a lower ratings drop when divisional teams are playing.  
 Lastly, regression analysis of each division in both NFC and AFC was performed. Each 
division does not necessarily include all 4 teams since it only covers LPM markets that were 
available in Nielson data. Following tables are the result of this analysis.  
 
Table 13-1. Regression Analysis of AFC East 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept 0.349 0.016 
TotalLagWinPct 0.492 0.016 
WinPctDiff -2.502 -0.050** 
AgeDiff 0.173 0.000 
DivAgeDiff -0.355 -0.000 
Regional -0.469 -0.038 
Distance -0.543 -0.000 
Rivalry 1.365 0.027 
Divisional -2.515 -0.043** 
ScoreMargin 7.297 0.019*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -3.304 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .3341. 
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Table 13-2. Regression Analysis of AFC North 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -0.313 -0.011 
TotalLagWinPct 1.007 0.027 
WinPctDiff -2.565 -0.042** 
AgeDiff 0.586 0.000 
DivAgeDiff 1.377 0.001 
Regional 1.039 0.059 
Distance -0.117 -0.000 
Rivalry 1.761 0.030* 
Divisional -3.456 -0.043*** 
ScoreMargin 10.789 0.018*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -6.109 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .2978. 
 
Table 13-3. Regression Analysis of AFC South 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept 0.446 0.027 
TotalLagWinPct -0.328 -0.015 
WinPctDiff -2.078 -0.054** 
AgeDiff -1.340 -0.001 
DivAgeDiff 0.133 0.000 
Regional 0.552 0.078 
Distance 1.879 0.000* 
Rivalry 0.287 0.007 
Divisional -1.161 -0.026 
ScoreMargin 5.354 0.017*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -3.273 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .2853. 
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Table 13-4. Regression Analysis of AFC West 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept 0.250 0.014 
TotalLagWinPct -0.172 -0.007 
WinPctDiff -1.948 -0.050* 
AgeDiff 0.071 0.000 
DivAgeDiff -0.982 -0.001 
Regional 0.083 0.009 
Distance 0.666 0.000 
Rivalry -0.424 -0.011 
Divisional -1.526 -0.037 
ScoreMargin 6.596 0.017*** 
ScoreMargin2 -3.295 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .2978. 
 
Table 13-5. Regression Analysis of NFC East 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept 0.958 0.030 
TotalLagWinPct -0.387 -0.009 
WinPctDiff -2.385 -0.032** 
AgeDiff -0.485 -0.000 
DivAgeDiff -1.436 -0.001 
Regional 0.154 0.006 
Distance 0.083 0.000 
Rivalry 0.475 0.007 
Divisional -1.223 -0.011 
ScoreMargin 10.082 0.016*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -5.248 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .2975. 
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Table 13-6. Regression Analysis of NFC North 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -1.658 -0.064* 
TotalLagWinPct 1.370 0.038 
WinPctDiff -1.355 -0.023 
AgeDiff 0.977 0.000 
DivAgeDiff -1.215 -0.001 
Regional -0.686 -0.036 
Distance 0.285 0.000 
Rivalry 0.272 0.005 
Divisional -2.915 -0.044*** 
ScoreMargin 11.043 0.021*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -5.627 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .4252. 
 
Table 13-7. Regression Analysis of NFC South 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -1.162 -0.042 
TotalLagWinPct 2.262 0.057** 
WinPctDiff -2.371 -0.038** 
AgeDiff 1.060 0.000 
DivAgeDiff -2.270 -0.001** 
Regional 0.445 0.024 
Distance -0.501 -0.000 
Rivalry 1.274 0.020 
Divisional 2.277 0.038** 
ScoreMargin 10.713 0.020*** 
ScoreMargin
2
 -6.746 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .2678. 
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Table 13-8. Regression Analysis of NFC West 
Variable t-value Parameter 
Intercept -0.975 -0.029 
TotalLagWinPct 1.430 0.030 
WinPctDiff -0.034 -0.000 
AgeDiff -1.421 -0.000 
DivAgeDiff -0.159 -0.000 
Regional 0.733 0.032 
Distance 0.202 0.000 
Rivalry 1.720 0.024* 
Divisional 0.807 0.014 
ScoreMargin 11.144 0.017*** 
ScoreMargin2 -6.573 -0.000*** 
Note: *** p <0.01.; ** p < 0.05.; * p < 0.1. 
R
2
 = .2835. 
 
For the interpretation of the result, AFC South will be omitted since only Houston was included 
in the data. TotalLagWinPct showed significance in NFC South division while WinPctDiff 
showed significance in all AFC divisions and NFC East and South divisions. DivAgeDiff showed 
significance only in NFC South and Rivalry showed significance in AFC North and NFC West 
divisions. Lastly, Divisional showed significance in AFC East, AFC North, NFC North, and 
NFC South divisions. Nevertheless, unlike other markets and divisions that showed significance 
in divisional variable, NFC South showed that ratings drop increased when divisional team was 
playing.  
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CHAPTER IV 
Discussion 
As one of the first empirical findings of this thesis, divisional games in the NFL offer 
some significance to sports fans so that they are more interested in neutral market games with 
divisional team playing. It turns out that fewer people were tuning out when at least one 
divisional team was playing compared to other “truly” neutral market games. That is, even 
within the out-of-market games, there existed a difference in the consumption pattern according 
to the rivalry. The effect was a 2 percent difference in average ratings drop. Moreover, no 
consistent pattern emerged of this effect according to score margins. Therefore, as a practical 
implication, there is a small extra premium to choose divisional games over other non-divisional 
games but with no clear pattern according to the competitiveness, so that it is difficult to 
conclude that divisional games are always desirable.  
Secondly, in the comparison analysis between winning, losing, and neutral market games 
with the divisional team winning and losing, the divisional team losing showed an interesting 
result. It was hypothesized that sports fans will tune out when their rival team is winning but stay 
tuned when their rival is losing. However, contrary to my initial expectation, divisional teams 
winning did not resemble the CORFing behavior of losing markets; in other words, there was no 
clear CORSing behavior in these games. As these games showed statistical differences with both 
winning and losing markets, it is hard to conclude how sports fans respond to these games yet. 
On the other hand, fans watching divisional teams losing did not stay tuned or BIRF; rather, it 
showed statistical similarity to CORFing of the losing market. The implication of this finding is 
that divisional teams might be sports fans’ second favorite teams. The base assumption of 
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BIRGing and CORFing stems from interconnection and association to a sports team. It is 
generally accepted that sports fans are less interested in out-of-market games since these games 
lack strong allegiance with fans. However, as the result shows, fans watching divisional games 
which ended up losing showed CORFing behavior. In other words, they are not enjoying the 
misfortune of their rivals; rather they are losing interest when their rivals are losing. Hence, there 
is a possibility that sports fans feel a sense of belonging to their divisional teams when there is no 
local market game. This might imply that divisional structure is not only creating rivalry within 
the division, but also creating a sense of belonging to the division. Sports fans are not only 
affiliated to their local team, but also affiliated to their division so that it offers some loyalty and 
pride. Therefore, in this sense, they are acting as if their team is losing when their divisional team 
is losing.  
Nevertheless, comparative analysis of the score intervals of these market types revealed 
that there is some schadenfreude-like behavior. Although both neutral market games with 
divisional teams winning and losing showed statistical significance to winning markets from 
margins of 9 points and up, neutral market games with divisional teams winning showed 
statistical difference from winning markets even at smaller margins (i.e., from margins of 3 
points and up). The winning market here is chosen as a point of reference since this market 
shows a relatively low ratings drop in general, and since there is no statistical difference between 
neutral market games with the divisional team winning or losing. That is, sports fans are more 
responsive to the competitiveness of the game when their rival team is winning compared to 
when their rival team is losing. In spite of the previous results of the comparative analysis of the 
average ratings drop, it becomes clear that sports fans enjoy the game when their divisional rival 
is losing compared to when their divisional rival is winning. That is, sports fans lose interest 
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when their rival team is winning even at the lower score difference while this happens at higher 
score difference when their rival team is losing. Therefore, it can also be said that 
competitiveness becomes the primary factor in deciding viewership demand of divisional neutral 
market games from the margin of 9 points.  
 There were numerous findings and implications through the regression analysis of ratings 
drop. Firstly, ScoreMargin was found to play a huge role in ratings drop in all of these markets 
from the regression analysis of neutral market games in each LPM market. The result indicated 
that competitiveness of the game is a major factor for sports fans in deciding whether to stay 
tuned or switch off. Therefore, in all cases, competitiveness of the game is a significant element 
in out-of-market games in all markets.  
Alavy, Gaskell, Leach, and Szymanski (2010) found evidence that more people watched 
games that have closer winning percent difference. The regression analysis of the WinPctDiff in 
this research, however, showed that ratings drop decreased as the variable increased in 
Philadelphia, Boston, Atlanta, Houston, Denver, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore, and this was also 
true in all of the AFC divisions and NFC East and South. It showed that sports fans tend to drop 
less when the difference is higher; that is, viewers are more interested in the games when 
expected result is more certain. Does this mean that fans do not appreciate the uncertainty nature 
of sport? Rather, as Buraimo and Simmons (2008) found, it is that sports fans are more likely to 
watch the Goliath team fall to the David. As Rottenberg (1956) argued, sports fans do not want a 
single champion or a few champions to dominate the league, so that it could be that they do not 
want to see the dominant team win repeatedly. Therefore, it can be argued that sports fans would 
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appreciate the games where a lower quality team defying expectation to defeat higher quality 
team. 
Furthermore, it was interesting to find that the AgeDiff variable did not show any 
significance in any of the markets tested since strategic group literature suggested that sharing a 
similar history would carry more significance to the game. The result showed significance in the 
DivAgeDiff variable which indicates that fans tend to be more interested in the games of 
divisional rivals who have a larger difference in division history. This implies that sports fans are 
more responsive to the duration of a team being placed within same division rather than its 
history within the league.  
This result supports the idea that the divisional setting in the NFL follows strategic group 
theory with implication of a sport franchise with a longer history within the division having a 
higher chance to be identified as a rival. This may be that a younger team’s acquiring legitimacy 
by defeating a well-established older team may be in effect. Singh, Tucker, and House (1986) 
found that new organizations increased their liability in the industry by retaining external 
legitimacy. Acquiring external legitimacy facilitates an organization’s accessibility to resources 
and endorsements, and increases its chance of survival in the industry, which is imperative for 
both young and old organizations. Sports teams can gain external legitimacy by increasing their 
number of winning games. For instance, one of the markets that showed significance was the 
Minnesota Vikings, a relatively younger team than any of the other teams within the NFC North 
division. As the Bears, the Lions, and the Packers are few of the oldest franchises in the NFL 
history, the Vikings would want to obtain legitimacy within the market through defeating such 
deep-rooted teams. Hence, every divisional match will have greater significance to their 
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respective fans. Another market that showed significance was Washington D.C., one of the 
oldest franchises in the NFL and within the division. This variable may have shown significance 
since one of its main rival is the Cowboys, the youngest and wealthiest team within NFC East 
division. The fans of the Redskins may want to see their team defeat the Cowboys, claiming the 
legitimacy of the team historically. Moreover, although the age of a team bolsters the 
organization’s influence within the market (Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986), losing 
competitiveness on field will negatively affect the interest of local fans and the liability within 
the market even for the old organization. Therefore, the implication in here is that sports fans are 
interested in the matches of its rival according to its divisional age, which has significance in 
acquisition or preservation of legitimacy within the division. 
The Distance variable showed significance in two markets—Chicago and Houston—
showing a higher ratings drop as the distance grows. Although the NFL guarantees the regional 
monopolies and divisional structure, so that neighboring teams do not necessarily compete 
regularly, it can be inferred that proximity plays its role in these markets. Nonetheless, the 
Chicago market has its divisional teams located in close proximity to all other NFL teams. Thus, 
it can also be argued that distance is in play for the Chicago market since all other non-divisional 
teams are farther than any of its divisional teams, so that the divisional effect has higher 
relevance rather than the proximity.  
Finally, regression analysis of the Divisional variable showed significance in the Chicago, 
Miami, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore markets. It was also found to be significant in AFC East, AFC 
North, NFC North, and NFC South divisions. The result suggests evidence of lower drop off in 
viewership when divisional teams were playing. This is the most important finding for the 
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purpose of this study, which indicates that rivalry has a positive effect in sports fans’ interest in 
out-of-market games. Although the markets showing this trend cannot entirely represent all of 
the markets in the NFL and it was only examined within neutral markets, rivalry should be 
considered as one of the important determinants in studying demand for sports. Moreover, 
leveraging rivalry as a key factor in out-of-market games is strongly encouraged to effectively 
program and schedule games in the NFL to increase the fan interest and satisfaction.  
Limitations 
One of the limitations of my thesis is that not all of the markets that have an NFL 
franchise are accounted for as only nineteen markets were utilized in the analysis. Additionally, 
this thesis did not examine the rivalry effect in the local markets, so that it is unclear how rivalry 
affects the viewership demand in the home market games. Moreover, in spite of the fact that 
there is an increase in viewership of sports through internet media, this demand was not 
examined in this thesis. The consumption patterns in this type of media could be different than 
those found in this research.   
Secondly, with the macro-level television viewership data it is impossible to separate 
sports fans according to their level of commitment. That is, die-hard fans and casual fans are not 
distinguished; rather they are consolidated within the ratings data. As such differences in 
viewership exist between them, it is not possible to see accurately which group tunes out at 
which score intervals using these data. Moreover, the number of professional franchises residing 
in each market could be influencing the drop off of the game. For instance, perhaps more people 
will be loyal to a local NFL franchise in the market where there is no other team or major league 
teams compared to the market where there are numerous alternatives to choose.  
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Lastly, since the data used in this thesis were based on the final result of each game, 
looking into the variation of scoring during each quarter of the game could enhance the 
understanding. For instance, a game that ended with a huge score difference could have been a 
close match until the final period of the game. In this case, it can be expected that the viewers of 
this game were highly engaged until the last minute, so that the ratings drop in the final interval 
would not be the most appropriate way to measure the desirability of the game.  
Conclusion 
The central purpose of this thesis was to suggest a better understanding of out-of-market 
games of the NFL as the viewership demand of sports has become more important than ever. 
Sports fans are swamped with sporting events through easily accessible television and it is 
imperative to understand what makes them watch each game. As Tainsky and McEvoy (2012) 
stated, failure in offering optimal games to viewers will eventually damage the profitability of 
the league and all other stakeholders involved as viewers lose their interest. However, previous 
studies have not yet taken rivalry as a significant factor in consumers’ choice of sport games. 
Thus, this study attempted to discover theoretical and empirical evidence of rivalry in sports 
rather than relying on the common belief that rivalry is a good thing. Specifically, the viewership 
demand of the NFL out-of-market games showed a small but positive association with divisional 
matches with evidence that some neutral market games could be desirable for sports fans. 
Moreover, sports fans tuned out even at the slight score difference when their rival was winning 
rather than losing. That is, there exists a schadenfraude-like behavior—seeking pleasure in 
another’s mishap—within the NFL out-of-market games and sports fans respond differently to 
the competitiveness of the game when a divisional team is playing. Therefore, considering 
rivalry as an imperative determinant in investigating consumption patterns of sports fans in 
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future research of demand for sports is highly encouraged. However, it is plausible that further 
study in other Major Leagues in the U.S. or other non-divisional structure leagues could yield 
different results.  
As Sanford and Scott (2014) stated, rivalry is one of the significant elements for sports 
fans to watch sports. Then one might ask the question, “Will it be possible to manipulate or 
create rivalry within sports artificially?” It is plausible through the divisional structure to achieve 
this as it highlights some of the features that can form a rivalry. A divisional setting guarantees a 
certain number of repetitive matches between divisional teams and embeds significance to these 
games by offering a limited prize, the divisional championship. Thus, this structure can 
effectively construct or reinforce the rivalry in sports rather than letting history and animosity 
build up on its own. Additionally, geographical proximity can increases chances of teams to be 
in rivalrous relationships as can be seen from traditional derby matches, where taking regional 
elements in divisonalization of a league could intensify the rivalry effect. Moreover, 
divisionalization of a league increases the chances for each team to advance to the playoff since 
teams do not have to face all of the teams in the league, mainly focusing on the divisional 
matches. This can allow a team to allocate its resources more efficiently due to reduced 
competition so that it is possible for teams to become more competitive in such environment 
compared to non-divisional settings. Closely matched teams have a higher chance of becoming 
rivals. Therefore, divisional structure can be an optimal setting for rivalry in sports. In this sense, 
a divisional setting can be used in a relatively new or existing sports leagues seeking for 
improvement in their demand. To do so, it is also imperative to understand in which conditions 
and environment divisional structure would be effectively implemented, which I will leave for 
the future research. 
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